Essence and Typology of Intellect in al-Farabi’s Epistemology

Zhakypbek Altaev**
Aliya Massalimova***
Assyl Tuleubekov****
Aizhan Doskozhanova*****

Abstract
This paper describes the forms of intellect presented in the philosophical doctrine of al-Farabi. The famous thinker and scholar of the Middle Ages, Abu Nasr al-Farabi, is known not only for following the philosophy of many ancient thinkers, such as, especially, Plato and Aristotle. Based on the achievements of ancient thinkers in the field of ontology and epistemology, al-Farabi developed an original conception of cognition and human intellect.
A specific feature of the Farabian tradition of studying the intellect is that he offered a deeper connection of the mind with ontology and the natural causes of the emergence of intellect. Thus, al-Farabi puts a special emphasis on the cosmological nature of human intellect.

Keywords
Ontology, epistemology, cognition, human intellect, cosmology.
Introduction

Origin of Islam was marked with the formation of a new type of knowledge and new rationality that confronted the former type of knowledge, included in the magic of mystical beliefs. First of all, new Islamic knowledge was ontological doctrine on creation and existence of everything. A multifaceted study of many life questions has turned Islamic thought into one of the most advanced of that time. Medieval Arabic thought became avant-garde and turned into a model of thinking. Along with existential basis Islamic knowledge involved the political, economic, and legal fields. It was the very emergence of philosophy as a rationalist trend in theology, as well as in fiqh (with questions about responsibility for one’s actions, freedom of human will, predetermination and determinism of what is happening in the world, questions about God’s wisdom in the affairs of the world). That is why, for instance, one of the Islamic perspectives – Mu’tazila – developed deep epistemology, based on strong rationalistic approach.

Obviously, rationalism is an extremely broad concept. However, Islamic philosophers viewed rationalism in all its aspects, singling out such aspects of rationalism, as reason, intellect, logic, the relation of reason and sensual cognition, the relationship of reason and religious thinking, and so on.

This was the beginning of what one might call the classical or formative period of philosophy in Arabic, which goes from the ninth to the twelfth centuries C.E. During this period, authors working in Arabic received and reinterpreted the philosophical inheritance of the Greeks, especially Aristotle. (Adamson 2005: 1)

Undoubtedly, the huge role in establishment of rationalism is played by Aristotelian tradition. Of course, Greek thought influenced not only the type of Arab-Muslim rationality, but also the direction of philosophical research. “The beginnings of Arabic philosophy coincide with the production of the first extensive translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, within the circle of translators associated with the founder of Arabic philosophy, al-Kindi” (Bertolacci 2012). A large number of Arabic-speaking thinkers studied a variety of issues. However, they all concentrated their attention on the central essence of the issues under consideration, namely the divine foundations of the existing world. The basis of many studies of the medieval period can
be found quite rational evidence of divine providence. This concerned both ontological issues and social problems. One of such ontological issues was the essence of the intellect as the world reason, which in the form of its universal states descends into the world of human reality. So, one of the thinkers who studied the true ontological meaning of intellect was Abu Nasr al-Farabi. This essay will disclose intellect in the al-Farabi’s interpretation in his *On the Meanings of the [Word] Intellect (Maqalah Fi Ma’ani al-Aql)*.

**Main body**

Human intellect is one of the little-studied entities in human nature. Investigating the intellectual abilities of people, many scientists come to the conclusion that intellect is something more universal than just the quality of human essence. It is justifiably argued that the nature of intellect goes beyond the purely human nature, as the ancient thinkers wrote about this.

The problem of the intellect or reason, expressed in Arabic in one word – ‘aql – was at the center of philosophical speculation from the earliest times. Aristotle raised the many questions that arise in connection with this highest faculty of the soul, but left many aspects of these questions unanswered. (Fakhry 2002: 70)

However, here it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between reason and intellect.

According to al-Farabi, reason in all its metamorphoses exists thanks to the intelligibles, which (while not cognized by intellect) existed in the form of potentially recognizable substrates.

The rational faculty in man is the repository of intelligible forms, which fall into two classes; those immaterial substances whose essence is to be both subjects and objects of intelligibility in act, and those which are only potentially intelligible because of their association with matter. Neither potential intelligibles nor the rational faculty as such are capable of effecting the transition from the state of potentiality to that of actuality without the intervention of an agency which actualizes their potentiality to know or to be known. (Fakhry 2004: 124)
In connection with this, when al-Farabi considers reason, he speaks of its own natural essence – intellect, although reason in epistemological interpretation of al-Farabi has a somewhat broader meaning than intellect.

With respect to the meaning of ‘reason’ as used by the public, when they describe a person as reasonable (‘aqil), it clearly refers to prudence (ta’aqqul) or sound judgment in the determination of what is right, as against the determination of what is wrong, generally referred to as cunning or perfidy. (Fakhry 2002: 71)

The reason includes all the characteristics of intellect, whereas the intellect is the possibility of using reason in life. “Prudence is what the public calls intellect. And when this faculty is in a human being, he is called intelligent” (Alfarabi 2001: 33). When a person begins to apply his intellect in his cognitive or social practice, he manifests the direct using of his reason.

Intellect is not the very act of its use in life; intellect is only the beginning of its applied meaning in activity. Intellectual characteristics of a human being (his intellectual abilities), together with their applied aspect, give us a general picture of reason. For example, if a person has high intelligence, but does bad deeds, his behavior cannot be called as reasonable one. Al-Farabi writes:

Intellect in understanding of what is truly good, in order to do it by somebody, or what is evil, to avoid it, is real reason. By intellect, they mean nothing other than the common one that Aristotle invested into the term of an act of intellect. Hence, for example, if someone calls someone as an intelligent person, then he wants to express that this person has an absolute ability to distinguish between what should be preferred or what should be avoided. (Al-Farabi 1972: 18)

However, al-Farabi mentions that the word intellect is used in several meanings, each of which requires a separate interpretation. He writes:

The first interpretation is that which is used in common speech, when one speaks about a person, that he is intelligent. The second interpretation is which the Mutakallims constantly argue about, while each of them understands intellect in his own way... The third [meaning of the word] intellect is contained in Aristotle’s treatise Book on Demonstration (Kitab al-Burhan). The fourth interpretation is mentioned by him [by Aristotle] in the sixth book of his Ethics.
The fifth interpretation is in [Aristotle’s] *On the Soul (De anima).*
The sixth interpretation is in [Aristotle’s] *Metaphysics.* (Al-Farabi 1972: 17)

Then, al-Farabi begins to carefully analyze each of these interpretations of intellect with his inherent methodological scrupulousness.

1. Intellect, applied to a human in common speech. For the first kind of intellect, when it is used in planning bad deeds, no one will doubt that the person, who uses his intellect for harmful target, has a low intelligence. His actions will be far from reasonable, and no one can call such a person as virtuous. Such a person is a villain, who uses his high intelligence and good ingenuity for negative aims. Thus, al-Farabi concludes that the most general interpretation of intellect refers us to its necessary synthesis with virtue, explaining that “only that human is reasonable who is intelligent and, at the same time, virtuous person, who apply his qualities to performing praiseworthy actions or for the avoidance of perverse actions. This is a reasonable person” (Al-Farabi 1972: 19).

2. Intellect as used by Mutakallims. Here, al-Farabi immediately indicates that representatives of this current give quite different explanations for the concept of intellect.

As for the sense in which the Mutakallimun use the term ‘reason’, referring to certain actions enjoined by reason or repudiated by reason, they simply mean by ‘reason’ in this context what is generally received by the public as a whole or for the most part. (Fakhry 2002: 71)

Al-Farabi also notes their constant controversy over the true meaning of intellect and how it relates to reason, stressing that “everyone understand [intellect] in his own way, they say: ‘This refers to what the reason claims’, or: ‘This is what the reason denies’, or: ‘This reason concedes’, or ‘does not accept’ (Al-Farabi 1972: 20). Al-Farabi does not accept this approach to one of the most important substances of human nature, such as intellect. He tries to give an objective analysis of the views of the Mutakallims on intellect, while relying on Aristotle’s writings:

The Mutakallims believed that the notion of intellect about which they argue among themselves is precisely the intellect mentioned by Aristotle in the book *Analytica Posteriora,* or [in any case] something
like that. But if we consider the first arguments that they lead, then it will be found that all of them are generally accepted arguments. Therefore, when expressing their opinion, they were guided by one opinion, but, in fact, they did expressed another one. (Al-Farabi 1972: 23)

This point is not typical for al-Farabi, who was accustomed to approaching the objects under study with deep methodological thoroughness.

3. Intellect interpreted by Aristotle in his treatise *Analytica Posteriora*. “When Aristotle uses the term “intellect” in *Posterior Analytics*, he precisely means the faculty of the soul by means of which man gains certainty about the necessary, true, and universal premises” (McGinnis et al. 2007: 70). Concerning this understanding of intellect, al-Farabi states: “As for the intellect mentioned by Aristotle in *Analytica Posteriora*, he understands only that ability of the soul, thanks to which a person receives a reliable knowledge of universal, true and necessary arguments” (Al-Farabi 1972: 20). Here al-Farabi tries to reduce this kind of intellect to a potential reason, which, not yet acquired by human nature, only begins to reach some form of connections with human soul. Such intellect obtains new knowledge not through logical speculation, but before any rational cognitive process.

Initially Farabi focuses on the *directness* of knowledge when he draws the visual analogy, emphasizing that the epistemic contact at issue involves the presence of the object to the knower at the time of its apprehension. Just as I can only see an object if it is present in my visual field, so too I can only know that object if it is present to my mind in such a way that I am *consciously* thinking of it now. (Black 2006: 23)

We can see that al-Farabi considers reason and intellect not so much as the ability to implement the results of logical operations in the mind, but rather as the moment of the unity of a person with his immediate reality. Thanks to this reality a person receives this primary ability in the form of such intellect, described by Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics*.

4. Intellect, interpreted by Aristotle in the sixth book of *Ethics*. As a follower of Aristotle, al-Farabi is very attentive to his interpretations of such an important concept as intellect. Explaining the fourth understanding of the
intellect given by Aristotle in his *Ethics*, al-Farabi agrees with his teacher. In *Ethics* Aristotle understands intellect as a part of soul, “which arises from the constant application of it to the corresponding kind of objects. This comes with time thanks to life experience that the soul receives from every single thing within its kind” (Al-Farabi 1972: 21). Such intellect opens a possibility for mind to more clearly define and draw conclusions about how to cognize an object and what in it can be accepted by the intellect and what is not.

In addition, this kind of intellect can turn acts of intelligibles into objects of intelligibles, which contributes to the formation of a reflexive intellect. If the intellect described by Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics* acts as a kind of primordial cognitive basis in the process of cognition, then the intellect described in *Ethics* is a kind of continuation of the first intellect, grasping ever more and more intelligible entities in the process of further cognition. In this regard, the second intellect is more developed, besides, it assumes a certain growth. al-Farabi writes that such an intellect “increases throughout the life of a person; judgments, which were discussed before, are getting stronger, and new judgments are added to them all the time” (Al-Farabi 1972: 22). And if a person has achieved mastery in using such intelligence, as al-Farabi points out, his judgments are accepted as authoritative, since such a person is an expert in the issues discussed by him. Al-Farabi explains here:

> The notion of authority means such [a person] who, if he pointed to something, his opinion is accepted without dispute and does not require verification. His instructions can be accepted, even if they are not based on any evidence. (Al-Farabi 1972: 22)

5. Intellect interpreted by Aristotle in his treatise *On the Soul (De anima)*. The last interpretation of intellect is perhaps the most important because both Aristotle and al-Farabi approached to this interpretation of intellect with all scientific and philosophical depth. The question of the essence of intellect affected ancient thinkers in various aspects. If today the phenomenon of intellect is inherent in the whole human race, then in antiquity some aspects of intellectual development were also seen in the animal world. The Aristotelian approach is no exception in this sense.

Aristotle’s *On the Soul* could be read as a forceful declaration of the existing differences between human and non-human animals. While
non-human animals are endowed only with sensitive faculties, human animals have intellectual faculties – dianoia and nous – that place them in a more sublime kind of life. (Kaukua 2016: 61)

The study of intellect increased with the growing need to understand human as a creature endowed with something other than representatives of other living worlds. A distinctive feature of human began to be seen in his intellectual features. However, unlike the modern scientific approach to the nature of intellect, where the intellect is inherent in human himself, in ancient times there was no deep confidence that intellect is a purely human attribute. And then began a rigorous study of the intellect, which lasted until modern science. One of the most interesting typologies of intellect is in the doctrine of Aristotle, which al-Farabi picked up and supplemented with certain details. “Aristotle established four aspects to the term “intellect” that he uses in De anima: (i) the potential intellect, (ii) the actual intellect, (iii) the acquired intellect, and (iv) the active intellect” (McGinnis et al. 2007: 71). Here we will analyze each of these types of intellect combining the epistemological vision of both Aristotle and Al-Farabi.

5a) Potential intellect. Al-Farabi gives the following definition of potential intellect: “Potential intellect is a kind of soul, part of it, one of the abilities of soul or something, the essence of which is capable or ready to abstract the essences and forms of existing objects from matter” (Al-Farabi 1972: 23). This definition is consonant with Aristotle’s understanding of soul, who states that the soul is the location of forms, with the proviso that not the whole soul, but its thinking part has forms not in reality, but in possibility. Both thinkers endow the human soul with not only an ability to perceive immediate empirical material in the form of sensory cognition of those objects that further form certain forms in the human soul. The intellect (in this respect, Aristotle often uses nous) is a part of the soul that rises above the sensory part of soul, and even above the imagination.

In al-Farabi, the potential intellect is so called, that it gives an ontological possibility to the cognizable objects to be transformed into cognitive forms. Potential intellect acts as a space of ontological cognitive possibilities for existing things in nature, which have come into the range of human cognition, in which they go beyond the limits of their natural substantiality and acquire their forms. Al-Farabi writes:
These nonmaterial forms abstract from the substance with which their existence is connected, only in order to get their forms in the potential intellect. And these forms, abstracted from their substances and become forms, are also intelligible objects of intellect. (Al-Farabi 1972: 23-24)

In turn, the potential intellect itself, as an ontological entity, also has the attribute of substantiality, which allows it to realize the objects of the intellect within itself. The potential intellect expresses an epistemological necessity, in which this intellect is also necessary, as well as the objects of cognition.

5b) Actual intellect. Al-Farabi writes: “If in this essence intelligible objects of intellect are realized, abstracted from the substance, then these objects become actual objects of the intellect” (Al-Farabi 1972: 25). Further, he reduces the actual objects of the intellect with the actual intellect itself, since the potential intellect, which took the form of an intelligible object, also assumes the existence of this form of the object, further abstracting the object from its original ontological state. Al-Farabi confirms:

The cognizing [essence] is nothing more than the fact that the intelligible objects of the intellect have become its forms because they have become identified with it. Consequently, the actual cognizing [essence] is equal the actual intellect and the actual intelligible object of intellect. (Al-Farabi 1972: 26)

The objects that were not yet known by the intellect were, according to al-Farabi, in their material substantiality. Studying the specifics of the cognitive process in Farabian tradition, the Finnish researcher of Islamic philosophy Jari Kaukua notes that “intellection becomes self-intellection only when the intellect is fully developed and can therefore dispense with any reference to external material objects” (Kaukua 2015: 19). However, having penetrated into the sphere of the cognitive intellect, material objects acquire a form that emanates from the essence of the intellect, which allows them to actualize their own already known substantiality. This moment also strengthens their external existentiality, multiplies their being, that is, in addition to their material existence, these objects also acquire their epistemological existence in the intellect. “When the intelligible objects of intellect are realized, they immediately become one of the things existing in the world and are listed, as
they are objects of intellect, to the totality of existing things” (Al-Farabi 1972: 27). Concerning the most actual intellect, then, as al-Farabi asserts, it is actual only in relation to those forms that have cognized and, thus, brought them to the level of actual intelligible objects. But with respect to objects, which are not yet known, the intellect remains to be as the potential one. In another way, we can say that “it [potential intellect] comprehends from its essence a certain being, which at the same time is an intelligible object of intellect” (Al-Farabi 1972: 29). Thus, the objects, being in their primary natural substance, become converted into intelligible entities and influence on the potential intellect itself, transforming it into the actual one. This moment gives the basis for the transition to the next kind of intellect – acquired intellect.

5c) Acquired intellect. If the two previous types of intellect, both potential and actual, have acquired their substantiality only in the process of cognition of intentional objects, then the acquired intellect represents the hypostasis of the intellect, which has already absorbed the essence of the cognizable objects. This means that when the actual (in fact, the second) intellect deals with a cognized object of intellect, it, together with this object, becomes an acquired intellect. Al-Farabi explains:

When the actual intellect comprehended the intelligible objects of the intellect, which were its forms insofar as they are actually intelligible, then the intellect, which we considered actual up to that time, turns into the acquired intellect. (Al-Farabi 1972: 30)

Here, al-Farabi explains one significant point that clarifies the essence of the process of cognition by all kinds of intellects. When a material object falls into the sphere of cognition by the intellect, then there is a mutual transformation of the substantialities of both the material object and the intellect. The material object begins to be abstracted by the intellect, which extracts from it its potential abstraction in the form of the same object, but already as an abstracted object. This is so-called ‘first existence’ of the object in the space of the intellect. In turn, the intellect itself, possessing the ability to extract the above-mentioned potency to be abstracted from a material object, is itself transformed into a potential intellect. That is, simultaneously with the extraction of abstraction from the object, the potential intellect extracts its own potentiality to be a potential intellect. Thus, according to al-Farabi, the first being of a material object in the process of cognition is an abstracted
object, whereas the first being of the cognizing intellect is a potential intellect. Further, when the potential intellect penetrates even deeper into the essence of the abstracted object (already possessing the first being in the sphere of the cognizing mind), this intellect actualizes the object, transforming it into an acting, or actual, object and giving it the opportunity to find its own so-called ‘second being’ in the space of being of the object. And here, the very potential intellect finds its second form of being, that is, actual intellect.

Returning to the acquired intellect, al-Farabi goes further into his essence. The acquired intellect, like the previous types of intellect, also acts as the next step in the development of intellect in general. It comes to exist, when abstract actual objects (and at this stage of the intellect al-Farabi calls them forms) are already generally realized as actual objects in their second existence. But here al-Farabi introduces one important remark, directly pointing to the conventionality of the boundaries between the types of intellect. This means that it is impossible when we fully understand an object in its actuality, we can always open new horizons in the essence of the object being cognized. Therefore, the acquired intellect, embracing the essence of the object (or forms) at this stage of its cognition, can again return to the previous stage of actual intellect in connection with the fact that an even deeper penetration into the essence of the object is required. Al-Farabi writes that

> the acquired intellect is, as it were, a substratum for these forms and, as it were, a form for actual intellect; the actual intellect itself is, as it were, a substratum and substance for the intellect acquired; the actual intellect is, therefore, a form for this entity, and the essence of intellect is, as it were, its substance. (Al-Farabi 1972: 32)

Here al-Farabi especially stresses that we must be extremely cautious about the procedure of our cognition, as well as consciousness.

5d) Active intellect. The universality of active intellect is not that it is above all other types of intellect. No, the active intellect is outside this hierarchy. As al-Farabi puts it, the perfection of the active intellect is, first, in that it acts as an absolute epistemological principle, only through which the transition of the intellect from one species to another is possible.

A possible objection could be that with his theory of the four stages of the intellect ultimately derived from Alexander’s On Intellect, al-
Farabi posited a chain of mutually subordinated intellects related to one another as form to matter. Thus, every form thought at one level by some intellect would be a form already present at a superior level in another intellect. (Rashed 2009: 53)

For a greater perception of the active intellect as a general principle of knowledge, al-Farabi cites a well-known example with the sun, the eye and the degree of illumination of things by the example of the relationship between the potential intellect and the actual intellect. Al-Farabi explains:

The relation of actual intelligence to potential intelligence is the same as the relation of the sun to the eye, which, while still in darkness, has only potential vision. Darkness is transparency in potency and at the same time actual opacity; transparency is lighting from the opposite light source. When light is realized in vision, air, or something like that, then as soon as the eye receives illumination, it becomes actual seeing, just as colors become actually visible. Moreover, we affirm that the eye has become actual seeing not because the light and transparency in it were actualized, but because, having received actual transparency, the eye also acquired the forms of visible objects, and only as a result it became actual seeing. (Al-Farabi 1972: 34)

In this respect, al-Farabi is not clueless. He relies on the same analogy that Aristotle presented in his treatise *On the Soul*, which also describes that mind is like light.

Alfarabi, deploying an analogy that had been suggested by Aristotle and developed by his followers, portrayed the active intellect as emitting a kind of light, which affects both images in the imaginative faculty and the human material intellect itself. When the analogue of light illumines the potentially intelligible images as well as the potentially thinking material intellect, it renders them actual. (Davidson 1992: 316)

After all, in some way light makes the colors that exist in the possibilities valid.

Conveniently, the Aristotelian cosmological theory postulated intellects that are associated with the spheres of the heavens. Al-Fārābī was the first to take advantage of this by identifying the agent intellect with the intellect of the celestial sphere closest to the earth. (Adamson 2015: 86)
In this respect, active intellect resides in all states of intellect, which acquires its transformation in the epistemological process of its interaction with material and non-material objects, which later acquire cognitive-abstract forms.

If the previous types of intellect make their cognitive path from the already known further to the unknown, then the active intellect acts in the reverse order. Active intellect is addressed to natural perfection, that is, “first it comprehends the most perfect of existing things” (Al-Farabi 1972: 37). In this respect, the active intellect has an integral essence, “it is indivisible, and its essence consists of indivisible things” (Al-Farabi 1972: 38). Thus, the very essence of active intellect closes the cycle of intellect in human nature, implying the latter as a stuff of the cosmic nature. In this place, al-Farabi finishes his treatise that later obtained a title *On the Meanings of the [Word] Intellect*. The descent of the intellect through the stages of the formation of the universal mind brings Al-Farabi closer to the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation. “Al-Farabi (cir. 870-950), who belonged to the second generation of Islamic philosophers, must be recognized as the real founder of Islamic Neo-Platonism” (Fakhry 1965: 470).

**Conclusion**

Thus, using the kinds of intellect that were set out by al-Farabi in his treatise, as a cognitive and social stratagem, a person has the opportunity to understand what his inner world is in its essence and what are the boundaries of that cognitive and social reality in which the person is concluded. “His theory of the intellect appears to be based on a close reading of Alexander of Aphrodisias and develops the concept of an Active Intellect standing outside the human intellect” (Adamson et al. 2005: 52) Al-Farabi studies the problem of intellect in several of his works. For example, in his *Principles of the Opinions of the Citizens of the Virtuous City* al-Farabi notes:

> As for the human intellect, it naturally appears in man from the beginning of his existence; it represents a certain arrangement in matter prepared for the perception of intelligible forms, hence it is the intellect of potency, the intellect is the first material and, in the same way, the intelligible possibilities. (Al-Farabi 1972: 283-284)

This once again confirms that the problem of intellect and reason for him has always been an urgent topic. Al-Farabi’s *Principles of the Opinions of the
Citizens of the Virtuous City is in many ways a treatise that is devoted to interpersonal relationships within a virtuous city. Moral relations between people, writes al-Farabi, are possible only in the case when each person practices real reason in his life and strives to ensure that each person also practices rational attitudes with other people. Only in this case can we talk about the possibility of building virtuous connections between people. However, speaking of morality, we may encounter an abstract view of human life. “The moral life by itself cannot be the best way of life because it is unphilosophic” (Colmo 1992: 967). But the relevance of studying the intellect by al-Farabi lies in the fact that he was able to bring the phenomenon of intellectual life to the level of everyday practice by proposing a model for studying intellect in a theoretical sense, as well as in actual practice within the life of the people of the virtuous city.

Quotation

Al-Farabi calls Aristotle’s work Posterior Analytics (Analytica Posteriora) precisely in this way. Today is known in Arabic as the Kitab al-Burhan (Book on Demonstration).

References


Farabi’nin Epistemolojisindeki Aklın Özü ve Tipolojisi*

Zhakypbek Altaev**
Aliya Massalimova***
Assyl Tuleubekov****
Aizhan Doskozhanova*****

Öz


Anahtar Kelimeler
Ontoloji, epistemoloji, biliş, insan zekası, kozmoloji.

---

* Geliş Tarihi: 08 Nisan 2019 – Kabul Tarihi: 28 Ağustos 2019
Bu makaleyi şu şekilde kaynak gösterebilirsiniz:

** Dr., Al-Farabi Kazak Ulusal Üniversitesi, Felsefe ve Siyaset Bilimi Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü – Almaty/Kazakistan
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4417-1576
altaev.kaznu@gmail.com

*** Dr., Al-Farabi Kazak Ulusal Üniversitesi, Felsefe ve Siyaset Bilimi Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü – Almaty/Kazakistan
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0708-2478
Aliya.Masalimova@kaznu.kz

**** Doktora Adayı, Uluslararası Bilgi Teknolojileri Üniversitesi, Bilgi Teknolojileri Fakültesi, Medya İletişimi ve Kazakistan Tarihi Bölümü – Almaty/Kazakhstan
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-9811-1048
a.tuleubekov1982@gmail.com

***** Doktora Öğrencisi, Uluslararası Bilgi Teknolojileri Üniversitesi, Bilgi Teknolojileri Fakültesi, Medya İletişimi ve Kazakistan Tarihi Bölümü – Almaty/Kazakhstan
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-5814-8716
a.doskozhanova1985@gmail.com
Сущность и типология интеллекта в эпистемологии аль-Фараби

Жакыпбек Алтаев**
Алия Масалимова***
Асыл Тулеубеков****
Айжан Доскожанова*****

Аннотация
В данной статье дается описание форм интеллекта, представленных в философской доктрине аль-Фараби. Известный мыслитель и ученый средневековья аль-Фараби известен не только тем, что был последователем античных философов, таких как, к примеру, Платон и Аристотель. Основываясь на достижениях античных мыслителей в сфере онтологии и эпистемологии, аль-Фараби развил оригинальное учение о познании и человеческом интеллекте. Специфика традиции аль-Фараби в изучении интеллекта состоит в том, что он предложил глубокую связь сознания с онтологией и естественными причинами возникновения интеллекта. Тем самым, аль-Фараби особенно подчеркивает космологическую природу человеческого интеллекта.

Ключевые слова
Онтология, эпистемология, человеческий интеллект, космология.

* Поступило в редакцию: 08 апреля 2019 г. – Принято в номер: 28 августа 2019 г.
Ссылка на статью:
** Д-р, Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, Факультет философии и политологии, Кафедра философии – Алматы / Казахстан
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4417-1576
altaev.kaznu@gmail.com
*** Д-р, Казахский национальный университет имени аль-Фараби, Факультет философии и политологии, Кафедра философии – Алматы / Казахстан
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0708-2478
Aliya.Masalimova@kaznu.kz
**** Аспирант, Международный университет информационных технологий, Факультет информационных технологий, Кафедра медиа коммуникаций и истории Казахстана – Алматы / Казахстан
ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0981-1048
a.tuleubekov1982@gmail.com
***** Аспирант, Международный университет информационных технологий, Факультет информационных технологий, Кафедра медиа коммуникаций и истории Казахстана – Алматы / Казахстан
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-5814-8716
a.doskozhanova1985@gmail.com