The Transformation of Occupational Structure and Chances for Mobility in Turkey in the Context of Studies on Social-Class Mobility

Abdulkerim SÖNMEZ

Abstract: This article makes an examination of the transformation of occupational structure and the major lines of development that can be expected to have taken place in the channels and the patterns of social-class mobility in Turkey. The data for this examination mainly come from general censuses of population and agriculture conducted by the State Institute of Statistics. This examination is placed in the context of images of industrial society, the findings of earlier research on social mobility in other countries and on the studies on rural transformation, migration and urbanization in Turkey. Depending on these data, the paper argues that although the transformation of the occupational structure has created novel chances and avenues for upward social-class mobility in the country, there is no indication that it has increased the level of fluidity between classes. On the contrary, an increased rigidity or class closure may be a more pronounced feature of the pattern of social mobility in Turkey.

Key Words: Class mobility, occupational structure, social mobility, social fluidity, social transformation

Introduction

This paper examines the transformation of occupational structure and the major lines of development that can be expected to have taken place in the channels and patterns of social-class mobility in Turkey. Although no empirical research on a national scale has yet been conducted on social mobility in Turkey, an examination of statistical data on the occupational structure and rates of change in employment status of the working population in connection with other social indicators and factors provides important clues towards understanding patterns of social and class mobility in the country. However, this examination requires also a theoretical contextualization for which a close study of the findings of earlier empirical research in the field of social-class mobility would be a great help.
It is important to draw attention to the fact that both in research and in debates on social-class mobility, the focus is not so much on the transformation of the structure of national economies and the occupational structure per se, but rather on the transformation of the channels and conditions for social mobility and of the bases of power and prestige in the society, in parallel with the development of the economy and the division of labour. Here, much of the emphasis is placed on discovering the extent to which there is a definite break away from an ascriptive social order to a meritocratic one as the economy evolves into an industrial one, and how this serves as a basis for the distribution of material and symbolic rewards, benefits and power in the society.

In this sense, the scale, scope, pattern and process of economic transformation in Turkey lead us to expect a major restructuring of the classes and their capacity for sustaining and reproducing themselves. Indeed, over the last 50 years or so Turkey has transformed itself from being an agrarian country in which nearly 85% of the population was involved in primary production and lived in villages to an industrial-urban society in which more than 70% of its population is now engaged in non-agricultural production and lives in urban areas. The growth of industry and services has created new channels for social mobility and undermined the significance of landownership, as one would expect to find in a society resting on an industrial economy. However, we have no reason to expect that chances for mobility have been distributed equally and that the process have given way to a meritocratic society in which each individual achieves what befits his/her individual qualities. On the contrary, there are convincing reasons to expect to find that old established classes have benefited more from the process of transformation and have a greater and better capacity to maintain and reproduce themselves under the new conditions, than the disadvantaged classes. This expectation sharply contradicts the political rhetoric expressing commitment to creating a modern society set free from all hindrances of an old ascriptive order, as expressed in the banning of all traditional titles and ranks in the early years of the Republican period, as well as the numerous cases of individuals who, with nothing other than their own efforts, have shown remarkable success in their profession and acquired wealth and/or prestige of immense significance.

**Images of Industrial Society and the Findings of Mobility Research**

Social mobility refers to the movement of individuals (or groups of individuals) between given locations of departure and destination in the social division of labour which are conceptualised as class or status locations (see Glass and Hall
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1954, Lipset and Bendix 1992 [1959], Marshall 1997, Moser and Hall 1954, Goldthorpe 1987, Wright 1997). At any given time an individual may occupy one or more of these positions and his/her general standing in society rests on an amalgamation of the amount of material and symbolic power, authority, resources, benefits, advantages and disadvantages that continued occupation of the position(s) enables him/her to enjoy or suffer. There is however a factual distinction, to use Goldthorpe and Hope’s vocabulary, between the symbolic and material aspects of all positions within the division of labour. The symbolic aspect refers to relative advantage and power in terms of prestige and rests on ‘the ability of an actor to exploit and benefit from meanings and values’, whereas the material aspect refers to ‘economic resources, authority, or physical force’. The symbolic aspect yields to the incumbent a certain degree of deference, acceptance or derogation, whereas the material aspect yields opportunities for wealth, income and benefits that can be used to support a particular level of consumption and a distinctive style of life (Goldthorpe and Hope 1974: 5).

The allocation or distribution of individuals to positions within any given division of labour has always been subject to several demographic, social, cultural, religious, political, legal, economic, technological and procedural factors and rules. It is therefore a matter of special empirical inquiry to establish which factors, in which ways and under what historical conditions and circumstances, have more or less causal or contingent significance in regulating this process, and what consequences they bring about for individuals, groups and the society in general. The primary objective of research on social mobility is in fact to study and examine the relations between these factors in a given society and to reach generalizable results for certain types of societies. Much of the literature on social mobility has been stimulated by considerations on the direction and consequences of social mobility with regard to political and social stability, class formation, class-based political action for social change and social stratification in contemporary societies. These efforts have contributed significantly in emancipating social theory from untested assumptions about class mobility and structure in contemporary-industrial societies.

There are in very broad terms two images of industrial society, namely liberal and Marxist. Most mobility research takes one as a point of departure and the other as an object of criticism (see Callinicos 2004[1999], Edgell 1993, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992, Giddens 1973, Hamilton and Hirszovich 1993, Krauss 1976, Ishida 2001, Kirby 1999 and Wright 1997). The liberal image, as expressed in the works of Blau and Duncan (1967), Bell (1973), Treiman (1970, 1977a, b), Treiman and Yip (1989) and
Parsons (1960, 1967 and 1971) draws a picture of open democratic society in which it is no longer possible to maintain the old ascriptive social order due to the logic and functional requirements of an industrial capitalist economy. An efficient functioning of such an economy requires matching the individual talents with the task demands of positions within the division of labour. This in turn requires a meritocratic order in which individual talents can be selected, trained, and put in use through the operation of a labour market subject to the conditions of free competition. However, such a meritocratic order cannot function effectively unless equality of opportunity in education and training for everybody is created and maintained in the society. Thus, there is a positive, linear, causal link between industrial maturity and mobility chances. This means, in practical terms, a progressive dissociation between social (or family) origin and the individual’s destination, and a progressive association between individual talents and destination in mobility positions and class locations. Then, in such a society, any discrepancy between individual talents and mobility destinations are not attributable to structural arrangements or extraneous factors, but to the psychological and moral makeup of the individuals. Such a mobility regime thus serves to create a both materially and morally safe ground for a liberal democratic order and political and social stability. This is because it removes all the ascriptive and structural barriers to social and class mobility and thus undermines the material and social basis for the formation and reproduction of class identities, alliance and collective action, and, by giving the individuals their due rewards proportional to their effort and genetic endowment, creates in them a feeling that the social order is morally right and just.

Though this picture portrays a positive account of the consequences of mobility for both individuals and the liberal democratic order, the judgements thereby reached are not shared by all scholars who have a commitment to the liberal ethos. Several scholars have drawn attention to the disruptive, destabilizing effects of social mobility both for individuals and for the society. For instance, Durkheim (1952), Sorokin (1959), Tocqueville (1962) and Lipset and Bendix (1992 [1959]) have expressed their concern with the negative consequences of constant social pressure over individuals to realize fully their individuality and to achieve greater success, which alienates individuals from social ties and protection, and may even result in suicide. Thus, Lipset and Bendix draw attention to a potential for the disruptive and destabilizing consequences of combativeness, frustration, rootlessness and other ills that a high level of mobility engenders, and question the validity of equating mobility with happiness: “...instead of
identifying greater equality of opportunity with human happiness, we begin to inquire into dissatisfactions which are endemic in our social life, including those dissatisfactions which create a drive for achievement and are hence a source of both the assets and liabilities of social mobility” (Lipset and Bendix 1992 [1959]: 287).

However, depending on data collected from ten industrial capitalist and socialist countries, Marshall and Firth have found no empirical evidence to support either the positive or the negative accounts of the consequences of mobility at individual level. On the contrary, ‘results show that individuals who move from working-class origins to middle class destinations are no more likely systematically satisfied or dissatisfied with life then are the socially immobile or even those downwardly mobile from advantaged backgrounds into the working-class. Indeed in all nations, the overall association between class experience and satisfaction with life is both weak and uneven across different life domains’ (Marshall and Firth 1999: 28). Therefore, according to the same authors, both positive and negative accounts of mobility constructed on the basis of autobiographies and case-studies “are not representative, and so offer a quite misleading picture of the impact of class mobility on personal satisfaction, the sources of which surely lie in other life experiences” (Marshall and Firth 1999: 46).

There is a second version of the liberal image of industrial society which argues that despite the growth in the actual volume of vertical mobility, the relative chances of mobility remain basically unchanged. According to this image, as portrayed first by Lipset and Zetterberg (1992 [1959]) and later in a modified form by Featherman, Jones and Hauser (1975) (as examined by Goldthorpe 1987 and Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992), the absolute rates of mobility display significant differences across industrial societies depending on the rate and form of economic growth and occupational change. However, industrial societies with a nuclear family system look similar in their overall pattern of relative mobility as expressed in odds ratios. What this means in actual terms is that a modern industrial economy has a tendency not only to grow in non-manual occupations while contracting in the actual size of manual occupations but also to create more managerial positions within both occupational divisions. Under the conditions of economic expansion, demands for labour in the higher levels of the occupational division of labour cannot all be met by means of self-recruitment. This in turn creates chances and channels for vertical mobility in which significant numbers of individuals from the most disadvantaged origins can reach higher levels of the occupational division of labour. This can take place through direct entry, through work life mobility, and through
intra- and intergenerational mobility, to such an extent that only lower classes or the working-class show a relative demographic homogeneity.

There is no indication that these developments in the economy and occupational structure lead in a certain direction where there is a progressive dissociation between class origins and destinations. On the contrary, relative mobility rates expressed in odds ratios are more or less constant and do not change over time. For instance, Goldthorpe’s analysis of empirical data on mobility in Britain indicates that, in terms of absolute numbers, only 25.3 percent of individuals in his Class I category (that is, the upper service class) come from the same origin, whereas the remainder come, in almost equal proportions, from six other class categories which are ranked lower than Class I. The actual volume of vertical mobility expressed in these figures confirms that chances for mobility exist and there is no clear and convincing indication of class closure at the higher levels of the occupational division of labour. But the same figures reveal significant differences in the relative chances of mobility to the extent that there is only one individual from working class origin in Class I location against four from the same class origin relative to the size of the class of origin, that is in terms of disparity ratios (Goldthorpe 1987: 44). However, disparity ratios are still not a sensitive and transparent enough way of examining the pattern of fluidity net of structural effects across societies and by historical periods within a given society. A better way of examining the pattern of fluidity is to compare changes in the rate of the relative chances of individuals maintaining their location in their class of origin against the relative chances of individuals from other classes of origin moving into the formers’ location (Goldthorpe 1987: 78). This way of looking at mobility chances and patterns reveals that there is a much greater difference in relative chances but a constancy or stability in the rates within a given society over time and an overall similarity between the industrial societies (Goldthorpe 1987, Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992). For instance, the 1972 Oxford Mobility data for England and Wales reveal that in the age period of occupational maturity (35 and above) the sons of higher and lower service class fathers (Class I and II) have roughly 3 and 15 times greater chances of maintaining their class location respectively against the chances of the sons of routine non-manual workers and lower-grade technical workers (Class III and V), and skilled-manual and manual workers (Class VI and VII) achieving Class I and II locations (Goldthorpe 1987: 80).

Thus looking at the same mobility data from different perspectives produces different results and lends support to various interpretations about the relevance of claims concerning the role of educational expansion in creating
channels for mobility and the actual practice of meritocracy in the process of social selection. For instance, on the basis of the Oxford Mobility data, Saunders (1997, 2002) claims, by examining disparity ratios allowed to change by educational attainment, that the British society is essentially a meritocratic one. Breen and Goldthorpe (1999: 13-17), by analysing the same data in terms of odds ratios, estimate that the chances of men born in upper service class maintaining their class location relative to the chances of men born in manual class positions achieving upper service class positions is roughly twenty to one. The important implication of these findings, they argue, “is that while merit certainly counts in mobility process, children of disadvantaged class origins have to display far more merit than do children of more advantaged origins in order to attain similar class positions” (Breen and Goldthorpe 1999: 21).

Contrary to the liberal image, the Marxist image of industrial society in mobility research is restricted in the main to capitalist societies, and is constructed by means of combining what are considered to be the main principles underlying the social divisions in all historical societies with the functional requirements of the logic of capitalist accumulation. According to this image, capitalist society is the last and most developed form of class divided societies which rest on the exploitation of one group of people by another, and hence on antagonistic interdependence in which “the material welfare of one group of people causally depends on the material deprivations of another” (Wright 1997: 10). What makes this exploitation possible is the exclusion of one group by another from ownership or control of productive resources in such a way that both sides are compelled to engage in relations of exchange. Thus any given society may be divided into two main classes as owners and non-owners of means of production. There is however a third category which escapes this definition and comprises those who neither exploit nor are exploited, because of owning the means of production but not extracting surplus from others. In places where ownership is separated from the actual control of the means of production, the individuals in positions of control are usually allocated to the former as long as their function is geared to maintain the extraction (and or to increase the amount of surplus extracted) from non-owners. The same principle applies to those who take part in various branches of political administration, the armed and security forces, and cultural production. This is because relations of production in a given type of economic order can be reproduced and maintained only if they are backed by a particular type of political organization and by an army of intellectuals and other individuals involved in cultural production. What makes them identical in class location (and for
general outlook and also unites them for class based political action) is that all of them live off the surplus produced by the non-owners who are compelled to sell their labour power to the owners in exchange for obtaining the means of livelihood. Hence, one party’s loss is the gain of the other, regardless of whether it is manifest or hidden; it is this objective antagonism of material interests grounded in the relations of production that puts the classes objectively in antagonistic interdependence.

Based on these principles, capitalism is the generalized mode of commodity production and differs from earlier modes of production in that it reorganizes, revolutionizes and transforms all the existing technological and social conditions, and the relations of production to achieve greater accumulation in a competitive market which results in the elimination from the market of the unsuccessful competitors and thus in the proletarianization of the self-employed producers and the centralization and concentration of capital. Success in this competition depends on the amount of surplus extracted from labourers which, in the final analysis, requires increasing the productivity of labour under given technological conditions. This is achieved mainly by breaking down the production process into smaller and simpler units of work tasks which require relatively simple training and less knowledge of production to be performed by the labourers, which is deskilling. However, in its strife for greater accumulation, capitalism not only expands into already existing areas of production but also develops by creating new cultural needs. These can be met by new commodities and new ways of accumulation which, in most cases, involve transformation of old ways and forms of exchanging services for a livelihood into relations of production, and these old ways can cover a wide variety of activities ranging from baby-sitting to government services in health, education and security. Perceived in this way, capitalist expansion and development involves in essence downward class mobility for most of the population. The prime victims of this process are expected to be mainly self-employed small farmers, artisans, shopkeepers and skilled workers at the initial phases of expansion, and essentially professionals and routine non-manual workers at later phases of its development (Marx 1983, 1961). The quotation below from Wright would suffice to summarize all the main trends and developments that classical Marxist theory predicts:

“The classical Marxist theory of capitalist development, especially the theories of the proletarization of labour and the concentration and centralization of capital, posits three trends which directly affect the class distribution of the labour force. First, the expansion of capitalism tends to destroy independent, self-employed producers. In the
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nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century this process massively affected self-employed farmers in the agricultural sector, but the process is a general one affecting all sectors of the economy. This yields the prediction of a steadily declining petty bourgeoisie. Second, the dynamics of capital accumulation tend to generate increasing concentration and centralization of capital as small capitalist firms are destroyed and larger firms grow. This trend yields the prediction of a decline in small employers and an expansion of managers, especially expert managers, to staff the administrative bureaucracies of corporations. Third, as noted above, in order to increase control over the labour force and the extraction of labour effort, capitalists have an incentive to reduce the autonomy of skilled labour and, where possible, replace skilled with unskilled labour. This, in turn, requires an expansion of the social control apparatus within production to monitor and supervise workers increasingly deprived of knowledge about production. The appropriation by management of knowledge from skilled workers should also lead to the expansion of the expert-manager category. These trends of intensified proletarianization in the labour process generate the prediction of an expansion of the working class, an expansion of supervisors, managers and expert managers, and a decline of (non-managerial) experts and skilled workers (Wright 1997: 93-95).

It is not the case that counter tendencies to these predictions go unnoticed by both Marxist and non-Marxist intellectuals. To begin with, Marx himself, as examined by Goldthorpe (1987: 8-9), draws attention to the growth of non-manual occupations and the chances thus created for upward mobility that can mostly be taken up by the children of those who have been pushed down. It is indeed the case that not only have non-manual occupations grown in actual volume in advanced capitalist societies, but the state has also become a major employer in main services such as health, education and public administration. The individuals working in these sectors should be considered, in theoretical terms, as belonging to non-productive workers living off the revenues produced by the working-class rather than being proletarianized and pushed into relations of capitalist exploitation. Furthermore, as shown by Wright (1997: 125-127) in the area of self-employment in industry and services, there are indications that the process of erosion has temporarily stopped and even in some cases reversed in many of the advanced capitalist countries. Finally, capitalist development does not necessarily involve deskilling. On the contrary, production in most
branches of both industry and services require acquisition by the workers of technical and procedural knowledge and skills which are far from being considered simple. These counter tendencies pose several theoretical questions especially concerning how the level and organization of capitalist development and the status of self-employment should be perceived and operationalized for empirical research. These issues become acute in places and areas of production where self-employment survives through subcontracting or in contractual relations which subsume the self-employed producers to big capitalist corporations.

The Transformation of Occupational Structure in Turkey

Turkish efforts for the modernization of the economy and society date back to the late 18th century and were initiated by the state bureaucracy in a piecemeal form to stop the constant decline of the Ottoman Empire. It was only by the early Republican era that these efforts assumed a more concerted form, and they started to yield visible results from the 1950s onwards. A good way of summarizing the direction and speed of change in the structure of the economy with regard to the issue in question is to trace the changes in the distribution of the economically active population by major economic sectors. As census data (SIS 2003b: 156-57) indicate, the Turkish economy remained predominantly agrarian until the mid 1980s, with the gradual decreasing of the economically active population in agricultural production from around 85 percent between 1927-50 to 50.6 percent in 1980 and 35.4 percent in 2000 (see Table 1 in appendix). Sectorial growth has taken place principally in community and personal services, manufacturing, and trades in absolute numbers, whereas the highest rates of increase in relative terms have taken place in electricity, gas and water, transportation and communication, and financial businesses and services. The demand for labour in the growing sectors of the economy was provided for mainly by domestic migration from villages to towns until the 1980s, and from that time onwards the urban population also started to become a major source of labour power.

The transformation in the structure of the economy is reflected in the distribution of the employed population by major occupational categories. According to the results of the 1927 population census (SIS 1929: XIVI), 81.6 percent of the economically active population (defined as aged 5 and over) was employed in agriculture, 5.6 percent in industry, 4.8 percent in commerce; 0.9 percent in liberal, 1.2 percent in administrative, 0.2 percent in legal (magistrates etc), 3.0 percent in military, 0.2 percent in communication and postal services, and 2.2 percent in the other professions.
Given that self-employment in agriculture, industry, trades and liberal professions was the norm, and agricultural production was only very primitively commercialised in the early days of Republican era, this yields in very broad terms a class structure composed predominantly of farmers or peasants (80 percent), petty bourgeoisie (10 percent), service class (5 percent) and working class (5 percent). These same figures can also be taken as an indicator of the last phase of the Ottoman class structure, as Keyder’s (1989) analysis indicates, although these figures are not in themselves an expression of the organization and asymmetric relations of the classes that were present in the scene.

This occupational structure does not seem to have changed at all until after the mid 1950s. According to the results of the 1950 census (SIS 1961: 259), 28.7 percent of the population aged 5 and over was without any profession (and 57 percent of these were in fact children below the age of 15). Without reference to occupational status, of the population with a profession and aged 15 and over (10,723 thousand) 83.6 percent were classified as farmers, 8.0 percent as craftsmen and craft workers, 3.6 percent as businessmen, managers and administrative workers, 1.4 percent as service workers, 1.0 percent as transportation workers, 1.0 percent as professional and technical workers, 0.8 percent as sales workers and 0.2 percent as mine workers. Since 1970 a different procedure has been applied for the definition and classification of the economically active population, and the 1970 census results (SIS 1977: 154-157) point towards a major shift taking place in the occupational structure. For instance, of the 13,476 thousand working population with a classified occupation in 1970, 74.9 percent was classified as farmers, 10.1 percent as non-agricultural production workers, 4.1 percent as service workers, 4.1 as technical and professional workers, 3.1 as sales workers, 2.3 percent as clerical-administrative workers and 0.6 percent as managers and businessmen. The shift of the population from agricultural to other occupational categories has continued, and by the year 2000 the economically active population in agriculture had come to occupy 48.4 percent and the people employed in professions in non-agricultural production (basically in manufacturing) had come to occupy 23.2 percent of the total and 45 percent of the population in all non-agricultural professions. The rate of shift in all occupational categories is also very noticeable in the 30 years period between 1970 and 2000 (see SIS 1977: 154-57 and 2003a: 194-97) during which the size of the population employed in non-agricultural production (i.e, manufacturing) increased by 341 percent, in administrative and the managerial professions by 330 percent, in the clerical profession by 320 percent, and in service and sales by 248 and 246 percent.
respectively, whereas there has been an increase of only 25 percent in the agricultural professions.

**Chances and Channels for Social Mobility**

Both in the Ottoman period and throughout the Republican era chances for upward mobility within agriculture have been very limited in range and scope. In general, the Ottoman land regime did not allow private ownership in land. Instead, peasant farmers were granted rights to till the land and their children were entitled to inherit these rights after the death of their parents. This legal practice did not, however, prevent de facto control over large tracts of lands by notables and other strong families in many localities across the empire, and the efforts by state bureaucracy for the redistribution of lands through legal regulations produced very limited effect. Thus the Ottoman agrarian structure was characterized by a numeric predominance of self-employed peasant farmers and economic and political domination of notables and big landowners (aghas) who, in most cases, farmed their lands by means of sharecropping arrangements and thus lived off rent in kind.

As part of the efforts to create suitable conditions for capitalist development, in 1926 the state introduced private ownership in land and entitled the peasant farmers to convert their rights over state lands into legal ownership. This removed all legal restrictions before capitalist accumulation in land and was combined with efforts to develop commercial farming. These included setting up agricultural sale and credit cooperatives, setting up demonstration farms, and introducing new technology and new methods of farming (see Tekeli and İlkin 1988, Toprak 1988). However, the country did not have sufficient resources for industrial development and therefore the state bureaucracy was at pains to push forward to capitalist development in agriculture, which could result in a high rate of unemployment, and to develop peasant commercial farming, which required land reform in localities where large landownership prevailed. In order to avoid the economic and political ills which could follow when either of these options was followed, the state did not commit itself wholeheartedly to land reform (see Sönmez 1993, Karaömerlioğlu 2000). Instead, for the sake of making use of inert resources, land reforms assumed in essence the character of distributing limited amounts of treasury lands to peasant farmers with no or inadequate land and turning a blind eye to the gradual acquisition by individual farmers of open and forest lands owned by itself. For the beneficiaries this meant upward mobility from the ranks of sharecroppers to that of independent farmers, but it was not enough to keep them in their new station for very long under the conditions of population growth and a
parable inheritance regime. Thus, until the 1950s by which time new channels for mobility became available, the peasant farmers had to stay within agriculture and face the consequences of population growth, which meant either no or a regressive growth in the average size of the farms. According to the results of agricultural censuses, average farm size has remained throughout the Republican era around 60 decars but the proportion of households cultivating only their own farms rose from 74 % in 1950 to 96 % in 2001 (see SIS 1956, 1983, 1994 and 2004).

In a paradoxical fashion, the state’s commitment to economic development and the commercialisation of agriculture combined with mixed feelings about liberal rights in private ownership, was enough to make all independent farmers feel insecure about their future in land ownership and to discourage any long term investment in agricultural production. It was during the 1950’s, under the rule of the Democrat Party, that the farmers’ confidence in private landownership was restored and reinforced by the government’s commitment to liberalism, and commercial farming was given a very strong impetus by a whole set of policies put into effect (see Keyder 1988, 1993). The most important of these included investment in transportation infrastructure, provision of credit for investment in new machinery and technology, and assuming direct responsibility for the purchasing of principal industrial/export crops at world market prices (see Kip 1988, Sönmez 1993). Thus Turkish agriculture started to undergo a rapid and massive structural transformation, achieving full commercialisation of production if this is understood as the ratio of marketed crop output, and regional specialization in the production of major crops. However, the impact of this transformation on rural structures has not been even, uniform and unilinear across the country, as relevant literature on the subject reveals (Akdış 1985, Keyder 1988, 1993, Sönmez 1993, 2001, Stirling 1993). On the contrary, peasant farmers have acted in different ways and pursued different mobility strategies depending on many conditions at individual, local and national levels. What now is argued to be the consolidation of small scale farming in Turkish agriculture is but a material expression of the net result of the mobility strategies which have involved in most cases both lateral and occupational mobility on the part of the rural population.

Under normal conditions, lateral mobility took various (single or multi-stage) forms of rural to urban migration as well as migration from provincial towns to major cities (see Akşit 1997, Gedik 1996, Peker 1996, İçduygü and Ünal Alan 1997) and involved a great deal of occupational mobility usually resulting in short-range upward social mobility (see Yasa 1966, Karpat 2003[1976], Özer 1993). For instance, in a study on households in squatter
settlements in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir, 48.8% of the heads of these households reported to have come directly from villages and 44.8% from town centres. The primary reason behind their migration was to seek employment (72.6%) and the male heads of these households mostly found employment as manual workers (% 39.2), qualified manual workers (15.6%), technical workers (10.5%), clerical workers (9.3%) and as self-employed workers in trades and industry (12.1%). This main pattern of employment seems to have changed only slightly after settlement in squatter towns: the proportion of manual workers decreased to 25.5% and the proportion of qualified manual workers rose to 20.8% (Özer 1993: 129, 171, 174). This process was combined with a massive direct and indirect internal displacement in the Southeastern and Eastern provinces in the late 1980s and the early 1990s due to armed struggle against terrorism, and resulted mostly in downward mobility and marginalization for those who were displaced (see Türkyılmaz et al. 1998).

The migration from villages to towns was facilitated by improvement of transportation and mechanization of agriculture. However, contrary to common perceptions, mechanization of agriculture not only made marginal farmers redundant and thus pushed them out of villages but it also enabled farming households to reorganize their income-generating activities by allowing the surplus population to seek new forms of employment in both towns and villages, and to bring unutilised lands under cultivation. These in turn created new frontiers to be exploited by those farmers who opted to stay within agriculture. On the other hand, it was not the sheer growth of demand for labour in trades, manufacturing, services, transportation and communication and construction that accelerated the process of lateral mobility to a degree of rural exodus, but rather that the exodus was itself strong enough to create impetus for growth in all these sectors and chances for occupational and class mobility through self-employment and marketing of labour, and the acquisition of new forms of wealth and property. As Karpat (2003[1976]) comments, this form of urbanization was a distinctly new phenomenon, unique to newly developing countries, and it differed from earlier examples of rural migration as a response to industrial development.

It would be wrong to assume that chances for mobility in all these sectors of the economy were equal for every individual who joined the migrants. On the contrary, age, sex, personal assets in educational and technical qualifications and skills, economic resources that could be deployed, and social skills and connections for mobilizing support and solidarity seem to have played their part in an individual’s finding of employment and moving
up the social ladder. For instance, literacy and educational qualifications have been important assets in finding employment especially in governmental bureaucratic organizations and establishments and in various branches of large industries and trades, whereas lack of such assets has forced migrants to seek employment mainly in the construction industry and personal services. Trades, commerce, transportation and the manufacturing industry have offered greater opportunities for self-employment and upward mobility depending on the conditions of the market, whereas secure contractual employment has been a more pronounced feature of work in other sectors of the economy requiring high educational qualifications and technical skills. In addition, regulations for health insurance, pension funds, and perquisites have favoured those who are employed on a service or labour contract in the public sector and in large establishments, whereas casual employment has been the dominant form in the construction industry and hence deprived the workers from benefits that have been available to individuals working in other sectors. These in turn have greatly influenced chances for in-work mobility and the amount of resources that can be deployed for intergenerational mobility.

These trends are well reflected in the statistical information available in censuses of population (SIS 1961: 358, 19?? (pub.no 452): 312, 1977: 126-31 and 154, 1984: 100-101, 1993: 128-29, 2000a: 192-97) about the employment status of the working population by sex and occupational categories (see Table 2 in appendix). According to population census results, the proportion of self-employed (including employers and unpaid family workers) was 87.9 percent in 1950 and fell to 80.4 % in 1960, 72.4 % in 1970, 66.6 % in 1980, 61.5 % in 1990 and 56.4 % in 2000. Throughout this 50 year period, the proportion of self-employment in agriculture remained almost unchanged, with a proportion revolving around 95 %, whereas in other sectors of the economy self-employment showed a rapid decline from 34.2 % in 1950 to 18.7 % in 2000 (see Table 3 in appendix). A comparison that the data allow us to make for the last 30 years by employment status and occupational groups indicates that in the year 1970 the proportion of self-employment was 13.0 % among scientific, technical and professional workers, 0.7 among administrative and managerial workers, 0.03 among clerical workers, 79.6 % among commercial and sales workers, 23.8 among service workers, 94.6 among agricultural and forest workers and 38.7 % among workers engaged in non-agricultural production. By the year 2000, self-employment within all of these occupational categories, save agricultural, administrative, managerial and clerical workers, shows further regression and falls to 9.1 % among scientific, technical and
professional workers, 55.4% among commercial and sales workers, 13.5% among service workers and 15.9% among workers engaged in non-agricultural production (see Table 4 in appendix). The slight increase in the proportion of self-employment among agricultural (96.7%) and clerical workers (0.34%) is negligible, whereas the rapid increase (57.3%) among managerial and administrative workers seems to have resulted from definitional procedures rather than being a matter of genuine structural shift taking place in the conditions of employment.

Self-employment remains widespread among women due to their predominance in agriculture, but the growth of female employment (which has increased by 62% in general, by 38% in agriculture and by 249% in other sectors of the economy) seems to be reversing this general picture and putting them in these other professional categories behind the male workers. For instance, in the year 1970 the proportion of self-employment was 89.7% among all female workers and 61.5% among male workers, whereas the proportions fell respectively to 75.7% and 45.5% by the year 2000. Contrary to this general picture, in the year 1970, the rate of female and male self-employment respectively was 96.4 and 92.8% among agricultural workers, 11.3 and 13.5% among scientific, technical and professional workers, 3.8 and 0.6% among managerial and administrative workers, 0.01 and 0.03% among clerical workers, 56.2 and 80.5 among commercial and sales workers, 15.4 and 24.6% among service workers, and 66.4 and 32.2% among workers engaged in non-agricultural production. Within the 30 year period, however, the proportion of female and male self-employment fell respectively to 5.0 and 11.2% among scientific, technical and professional workers, 24.6 and 60.2% among commercial and sales workers, 10.2 and 13.7% among service workers and 5.9 and 16.9% among workers engaged in non-agricultural production.

A steady increase in the rate of population employed in non-agricultural activities accompanied by a constant fall in the rate of self-employment among all occupational categories excluding agriculture confirms to some extent the predictions made by both liberal and Marxist images of industrial/capitalist societies as referred to above. Census results imply also a close association existing between the level of education and the distribution of the employed population by occupational categories, as the liberal image of industrial society argues to be the case for a modern capitalist/industrializing economy. To illustrate the point in question, the census results for the year 2000 (SIS 2003a: 186-93) indicate that scientific, technical and professional occupations on the one hand and agriculture on the other stand at polar opposites with regard to the level of education.
completed by the individuals in employment (see Table 5 in appendix). Of 
2,329 thousand individuals with a degree in higher education, 59.5 % is 
classified as scientific, technical and professional workers, 5.5 % as 
administrative and managerial workers, 13.6 % as clerical workers, 7.5 % as 
commercial and sale workers, 3.3 % as service workers, 2.8 % as farm 
managers and supervisors, 7.1 % as workers engaged in non-agricultural 
production and 3.8 % as not classifiable by occupation. At the opposite end 
of this distribution stand 3,098 thousand individuals with no education 
whatsoever, of whom 93.6 % work as farmers, 3.4 % work in non-
agricultural production and 1.7 % in services. Employment in agriculture 
falls to 81.7 % among those individuals who are literate but have no 
certificate, to 57.1 % among primary school leavers, to 28.7 % percent 
among secondary school leavers (including those who have the certificate of 
8-year basic education) and further down to 15.2 % among those who a 
have diploma of lycé education. Although the individuals with diplomas in 
secondary and lycé education are concentrated in non-agricultural 
production and transportation (37.1 % and 27.0 %), 22.0 % of the latter 
have also found their way into clerical professions.

The kind of mobility that this distribution by educational qualifications refers 
to cannot be inferred directly from the results of the census. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to outline the general pattern of educational expansion and the 
provision of educational services as a means to help make some very broad 
predictions. The Turkish modernization process is characterized by an 
ideological commitment to providing free basic education to all as a 
necessary part of cultural and social transformation. This commitment was 
not accompanied, however, by a parallel commitment to equal provision of 
educational facilities and services to such an extent that all status and class 
distinctions in the larger society could be overcome. On the contrary, in the 
allocation of material and human resources for educational facilities and 
services, marked differences have always existed between central and 
peripheral districts within each town, and central and peripheral towns and 
urban and rural settlements across the country. For instance, in towns the 
schools in central residential districts with an overtly middle and upper class 
resident population have always had better educational facilities and 
received from the government better funds and resources and access to 
better schools has usually been made subject to residence in the district. 
School administrators have very often been careful about putting students of 
similar background in the same classrooms and allocating the best qualified 
teaching staff to classes comprising children from middle and upper class 
backgrounds whenever the residence rule for registration cannot be applied.
Remote towns and villages have always received relatively small resources for educational facilities and services and especially the villages have rarely had schools for secondary and further education. Thus access to further education has always required either sending the children to town centres, which put extra financial burden on families that can not easily be met by the great majority of rural households, or moving with them to town centres which demands extra plans about employment and residence. Facilities for higher education have been even more limited and the competition for access to university education has increasingly come to require the sort of long-term planning and generous investment in the education of the children that cannot be afforded by most families unless huge efforts and sacrifices are made. Scholarships offered to successful children from disadvantaged backgrounds have been rather limited and the educational loans offered to university students for school fees and expenses have increasingly become insignificant in reducing the financial burden that has to be shouldered by those individuals who wish to pursue higher education. Although later research may prove the opposite to be the case, it is possible to argue tentatively that educational expansion has on the whole favoured the middle and upper layers of the society. The general pattern of resource allocation has tended to function as a hidden quota system or a policy of positive discrimination favouring individuals coming from middle and upper classes. This tendency has further been reinforced by rapid expansion of privatization in the last two decades at all levels of education, and coincides with growing elitism in both public and private schools and a parallel development in the attitudes of the private sector companies and both state and private universities in recruitment. All these later developments point towards a tendency for reduced fluidity between classes and a purposeful attempt by the middle and upper classes to secure vacancies at the higher levels of the division of labour for their own children. These developments in turn increasingly force individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds to employ strategies for short-range mobility via educational channels for which vocational education provide them with the best possible qualifications. These same tendencies provide also the context in which to understand why certain types of educational reform initiatives and the lifting of discriminatory regulations disfavouring the pupils in vocational schools in the university entrance exams receive extreme reaction from circles and organizations which stand for certain classes in the country, although reactions are expressed as if they result from either a pure ideological commitment to defending a particular political value or from a concern for providing trained middle-range technical labour for sustained economic growth.
References


Sönmez, The Transformation of Occupational Structure and Chances for Mobility ...


_____ (2002). “Reflections on the meritocracy debate in Britain: a response to


Appendix: Tables
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing</th>
<th>Mining and quarrying</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Electricity, gas and water</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Wholesale retail trade, restaurants and hotels</th>
<th>Transportation, Communication and storage</th>
<th>Finance, insurance and real estate services</th>
<th>Community, social and personal services</th>
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<td>4 909</td>
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<td>59.8</td>
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<td>50.6</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>893</td>
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<td>46.9</td>
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<td>7 103</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td>1 313</td>
<td>3 748</td>
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**Source:** SIS, *Statistical Indicators 1923-2002*: 156-157

**Rate of increase 1:** With respect to 1927 in the year 2000 (2000-1927/1927*100).

**Rate of increase 2:** With respect to 1950 in the year 2000 (2000-1950/1950*100).
Table 2. Self-employed (including employers and unpaid household workers) and Employee Population by Census Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Self-employed</th>
<th>Employee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>10 492 204</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9 230 001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12 497 333</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10 060 195</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15 118 887</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10 946 188</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>18 475 224</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12 313 222</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>23 379 371</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14 388 644</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25 994 849</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14 680 819</td>
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Table 3. Self-employed (including employers and unpaid household workers) and Employee Population in Agriculture (including forestry and fishing) and Other Sectors by Selected Census Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>In Agricultural Production</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>In non-agricultural Production</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
</table>
|       | Total                       | Self-employed | Employee | Total | Self-employed | Employee |%
|       | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % | Number | % |
| 1950\(^1\) | 1 | - | - | - | 1 268 996 | 100 | 434 591 | 34.2 |
| 1970\(^2\) | 10 101 858 | 100 | 9 564 111 | 94.6 | 537 747 | 5.4 | 5 017 029 | 100 | 1 382 077 | 27.5 | 3 634 952 | 72.5 |
| 1980\(^2\) | 11 055 031 | 100 | 10 502 612 | 95.0 | 552 419 | 5.0 | 7 420 193 | 100 | 1 258 191 | 16.9 | 6 162 002 | 83.1 |
| 1990\(^2\) | 12 527 976 | 100 | 11 966 854 | 95.5 | 561 122 | 4.5 | 10 851 365 | 100 | 2 421 760 | 22.3 | 8 429 605 | 77.7 |
| 2000\(^2\) | 12 177 543 | 100 | 11 762 341 | 96.5 | 415 202 | 3.5 | 13 399 812 | 100 | 2 503 276 | 18.7 | 10 896 536 | 81.3 |
| R.I.1 | - | - | - | - | 956 | - | 476 | - | 1 260 | - | - |
| R.I.2 | 11 | - | 12 | - | -23 | - | 167 | - | 81 | - | 199 | - |


Explanations: (1): For population aged 5 and over in places with a population over 5000; (2) For population aged 12 and over.


Table 4. Increase in the Number of Employed Population by Census Years, Sex, Occupational Categories and Occupational Status (in 000s).

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<tr>
<td>Employed population in total</td>
<td>15 25</td>
<td>118 997</td>
<td>72 9306</td>
<td>16 567</td>
<td>78 812</td>
<td>5 9429</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scientific, technical and</td>
<td>555 1 902</td>
<td>242 415</td>
<td>201 248</td>
<td>211 17</td>
<td>139 653</td>
<td>370</td>
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<td>professional workers</td>
<td>Administrative and managerial workers</td>
<td>85 366</td>
<td>330 80</td>
<td>312 5</td>
<td>36 620</td>
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<tr>
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<td>320 273</td>
<td>242 934</td>
<td>73 609</td>
<td>734</td>
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<td>Sales workers</td>
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<td>246 446</td>
<td>211 1386</td>
<td>47 263</td>
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<td>229 1676</td>
<td>47 263</td>
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<td>forestry workers</td>
<td>101 593</td>
<td>245 5459</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>2 7133</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and related</td>
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<td>1 105 5 518</td>
<td>399 261</td>
<td>515 97</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>workers</td>
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<td>- 1 526 14</td>
<td>116 2</td>
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2. Employee Population

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<td>79 129</td>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed population in total</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5728</td>
<td>7540</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>7140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific, technical and professional workers</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and managerial workers</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and related workers</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry workers</td>
<td>9564</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4594</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and related workers</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 5. Distribution (in percent) of Employed Population by Occupational Categories and Level of Education in the Year 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational categories</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Literate with no certificate</th>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>Secondary school</th>
<th>Lycé</th>
<th>University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (in 000)</td>
<td>3,098</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>12,337</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>4,134</td>
<td>2,32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific, technical and professional workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and managerial workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial and sales workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, ranchers, fisherman, hunters and forestry workers</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>2.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural production and transportation workers</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1) Includes the individual who have completed basic education of 8 years.
2) Includes individuals who have completed vocational schools.
* As directors
Toplumsal-Sınıfsal Hareketlilik Çalışmaları Bağlamında Türkiye’de Mesleki Yapının Dönüşümü ve Toplumsal Hareketlilik Fırsatları

Abdülkerim SÖNMEZ∗

Özet: Bu çalışma mesleki yapının değişimine bağlı olarak Türkiye’de toplumsal hareketlilik fırsatları ve örüntülerinde meydana gelmesi beklenenebilecek değişimleri incelemekte ve yorumlamaktadır. Bu inceleme için istihdam edilen olgusal veriler nüfus ve tarım sayım sonuçlarından elde edilmiş olup, elde edilen sonuçlar sınav toplum imajları, diğer toplumlarda toplumsal hareketlilik hakkında yapılmış çalışmalar ile Türkiye’de kısral dönüşüm ve göç hakkında yapılmış çalışmaların bulguları ile bağlantılı olarak yorumlanmaktadır. Bu veri ve olgulara dayalı olarak çalışma, mesleki yapının dönüşümünün Türkiye’de yukarı doğru toplumsal hareketlilik için yeni yollar ve fırsatlar yaratmış olmakla birlikte bu fırsatların eşit dağılmadığı ve bundan dolayı da toplumsal hareketlilik örüntülerinde toplumsal sınıflar arasındaki akışkanlığın artırmasından çok giderek azalma ve kapanma eğilimlerinin daha belirgin olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sınıf hareketliliği, mesleki yapı, toplumsal hareketlilik, toplumsal akışkanlık, toplumsal dönüşüm

∗Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Sosyoloji Bölümü / ANKARA ksonmez@hacettepe.edu.tr
Возможности общественного движения и превращение профессиональной структуры в Турции в связи с работой в Общественном-Классовом Движении

Абдулькериим Сонмез

Резюме: Эта работа направлена на обозрение и рассмотрение предполагаемых изменений в положении общественного движения и превращение профессиональной структуры в Турции. Фактические данные, задействованные в данном исследовании, с полученными данными переписи села и населения, трактуются в связи с открытиями в работе о миграции и полевой миграции в Турции наравне с выполненными работами об общественном движении в других социумах. Данная работа, основанная на этих данных и фактах, наряду с созданием новых путей и возможностей для общественного движения в Турции в трансформации в профессиональной сфере, утверждает, что эти возможности не распределены равномерно и поэтому в организациях общественного движения отчетливо наблюдается не текучесть между общественными классами, а тенденция к постепенному уменьшению и закрытию.

Ключевые Слова: классовое движение, профессиональная структура, общественное движение, общественная текучесть, общественная трансформация

*Университет Хаджетепе, Отделение Социологии / АНКАРА
ksonmez@hacettepe.edu.tr