The Roots of Anti-Americanism in Turkey 1945-1960

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Abstract
The conventional wisdom asserts that anti-Americanism in Turkey started as a result of the Cyprus Crisis in 1964. Yet the roots of anti-Americanism can be traced back to the 1945-1960 period, the rosy years of Turkish-American relations. In these years, some in Turkey criticized the government for granting political and economic concessions to the U.S. which were, they thought, reminiscent of the infamous capitulations of the Ottoman period. Furthermore, they argued, Turkey did not become an equal ally but was downgraded to a U.S. colony. Many critics voiced their concerns that Turkey’s internal and external affairs were shaped in accordance not with Turkish but with American interests. Last, but not least, many accused America of cultural imperialism. These anti-American views were repeated over the succeeding years with slight alterations. Hence, this study will attempt to shed light not only on the 1960s’ fiercer version of anti-Americanism but also on the current debates.

Keywords
Turkey, U.S., Anti-Americanism, 1945-1960, Turkish-American relations, Turkish foreign policy

Introduction
Anti-Americanism, which has become a rather trendy topic in the Turkish-American relations literature following the 2003 Iraq War, is actually not a new phenomenon for the Turks. Conventional wisdom holds that anti-Americanism in Turkey came about in the 1960s as an ideological attitude adopted by, in the main, leftist groups. Thanks to the 1961 Constitution,
previously non-organized and silenced ideological groups, particularly on the left, established themselves in the political and public spheres. Meanwhile, a great number of people from various segments of the society felt betrayed by the country’s closest ally, the United States, as certain American foreign policy choices became public, such as the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory as a result of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the way the US intervened in the Cyprus crisis of 1963/1964 through the notorious Johnson letter. Hence many started to think that the US was acting in violation of Turkish national interests. In this context, critics, especially among the leftist groups, spearheaded an upsurge of anti-Americanism, arguing that Turkish independence was being compromised.

In his assessment of the anti-Americanism that was on the rise in the mid-1960s Váli (1971:144) reveals his surprise at how such a militant stance had come about after twenty years of close cooperation. Indeed, Turkey was “the ideal ally” (Váli 1971:127) during the early 1950s when reports poured in to Washington warning about a “possible confusion on the part of [the US’s] allies as US policy and perhaps a lessening of confidence in US leadership” (Circular no: 60, From Roundtree, Ankara 30.07.1953). As of 1955, the pro-government daily Zafer announced that “friendly relations between two countries are so solid that they would excite jealousy” (“Fırsat Kollayanlara Fırsat Verilmiyeciktir”. 10 January 1955).

Yet even though anti-Americanism surfaced in the 1960s, it had its roots in the 1945-1960 period (see Uslu 2000). Public reactions with regard to the main issue areas of anti-Americanism, albeit with less ferocity, had already been expressed during that time span. In other words, it could be argued that misgivings and concerns that generated anti-Americanism in Turkey in the 1960s had already been present in previous periods. Such a setting could easily bring about a more vocal anti-Americanism as in the 1960s certain US policies failed to fulfill Turkish expectations and the 1961 Constitution transformed/enlarged the domestic political sphere providing room for previously estranged groups.

For these reasons, this article aims to trace the emergence and roots of anti-Americanism in Turkey and to analyze its historical evolution between 1945 and 1960. In doing so, it uses primary sources such as the US State Department Records, and Turkish periodicals, e.g. daily newspapers and weekly magazines. After discussing the causes of anti-Americanism generally, the article examines main issues of anti-Americanism in depth.
The Causes of Anti-Americanism:

Criss (2002) contends that anti-Americanism was closely associated with Turkish endeavors to preserve sovereignty. In the same vein, Türkmen (2010) defines the Turkish attitude as “sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism” with reference to Katzenstein and Keohane’s theoretical model. According to Katzenstein and Keohane (2007: 32-33), in societies where national identity and national independence are top priorities any kind of American intervention is seen as an attack on sovereignty. Váli (1971:144-146), writing in an earlier period, cites the Turks’ national pride, cultural differences between the two peoples which might include temperamental and social incompatibilities, the American support extended to the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - DP) -and later to the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - AP)- governments, the Turkish perception of American foreign policy as imperialistic, issues concerning American economic aid, and communist or pro-Soviet propaganda as the causes of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Sözen (1985: 122), on the other hand, focused on some social dynamics in the 1960s, like urban-lower and lower middle classes’ perceptions that Americans had become the real masters of the country and that a gradual replacement of the traditional, indigenous elites with Americans’ Turkish “collaborators” constituting the newly enriched classes, who adopted American life styles, would lead to the degeneration of the society both socially and morally.

On the other hand, in their assessment of the situation in 1959, American representatives admitted that “the combination of the Turk’s innate suspicion of foreigners with the conspicuous American presence in Turkey is bound to produce an appreciable degree of anti-American sentiment” (The US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 611.82/8-459). In another report (File 350, From Mathews, Istanbul 22.12.1952) dated early 1950s, it was maintained that Turks did not have a favorable stance vis-à-vis American people due to their xenophobia which could only be compared to that of South Asians in its shrillness. The report highlighted three area of particular Turkish sensitivity about which a careless step by Americans could cause a fierce public reaction with grave consequences for Turkish-American relations: “a) the Turk’s strong personal sense of dignity; b) [his] mixed feelings about Islam and religion generally; c) [his] acute sense of political independence.” In order to avoid problems, American representatives advised American personnel and private citizens living in Turkey to limit personal contact with Turks and to be inconspicuous. For them, it was imperative never to give the impression to the Turks that Americans had a secret agenda of either pushing towards or pulling away from Islam and to retain neutral attitude toward any kind of religious issue. They also cautioned against the dangers of being closely identified with any political party or group in Turkey
as it might spark a perilous debate about political subservience to the US.

Finally, the report suggested continuing military and economic aid programs to maintain good bilateral relations because “as long as [the Turk] continues to receive aid, he will make an effort to get along with us”.

**The Birth of the Alliance:**

The image of the Turk among the American public was largely shaped by the Greek and Armenian Americans’ propaganda efforts during and after World War I. As a result, the Ottoman Empire came to have a reputation of having suppressed its non-Muslim populations, and Turks in general were not subjects of great sympathy (McCarthy 2010). Yet as World War II drew to an end, Turkey did not seem to have a special meaning for the Americans for better or worse. On the other hand, for Turks, Americans proved to be a fitting candidate for a clean start of relations with the West, unlike the British and French, the military adversaries during World War I and the Turkish War of Liberation, or the Russians, the so-called ‘eternal enemy’. The unique opportunity to set the bilateral relations against this unproblematic background enabled to present the US as an ‘altruistic’, ‘benevolent’, strong friend ready to help out the Turks and facilitated Turks in accepting this image together with the rest of America’s cultural and social munificence.

In this context, the main factor that drove Turkey towards the US was the Soviet demands for bases on the Turkish Straits and territorial concessions in Turkey’s east (see Gürün 1991: 276-311). These developments, described as “the nightmare of 1945” by Toker (1971) caused Turkey to ask for strategic support from the West and particularly its new leader, the US. A September 1945 report by the American Embassy in Ankara (NARA711.67/9-1945) concerned Turkish efforts to this end. Turkish fear of Soviets¹ and the dire exigency for Western support to deter them was seen as “an unusual opportunity [for] the US to extend its influence in Turkey and in the Near East”. Being aware that Turks pinned their hopes on the US as the richest country of the post-war world from both a political and an economic perspective, Americans thought that the Turkish perception of the American administration as having no ulterior political or economic motives in its dealings with Turkey, unlike the British, increased their influence and prestige. The report argued that some outstanding issues might require solutions in order to improve relations, such as the ambivalent American attitude concerning the problems between Turkey and Russia, the settlement of the Lend-Lease Agreement, and difficulties related to the bilateral trade.
In fact, Turkey’s debt arising from the Lend-Lease Agreement (see Karakaş 2009) was wiped out by another agreement dated May 7, 1946, freeing Ankara from a heavy burden (Ülman 1961: 91, Erhan 2001: 525). By adding an article to the agreement which stipulated that special and differential treatments in international trade should be eliminated and customs tariffs and quotas should be reduced (Sander 1979: 44), the US aimed to solve the third problem, i.e. trade related issues.

With regard to the Soviet threat, the American stance, which had initially been vague, was crystallized partially due to the British pressure. Turkey was gradually relieved after President Harry Truman declared to the whole world that “Turkey deserves [American] attention” (Truman Doctrine 1947). Actually almost a year before the Truman Doctrine, the US had already demonstrated that they had Turkey’s back by sending the Missouri, one of the largest war ships in the world, to Istanbul. In April 1946, the Missouri brought to Turkey the body of Mehmet Münir Ertegün, Turkey’s late Ambassador to Washington who had passed away many months earlier in November 1944. Erhan (2001: 524-525) argues that through the Missouri’s visit America signaled to the Soviets that the status of the Straits could only be changed with its consent. Bozkurt (2007), on the other hand, documents how the Missouri’s visit was turned into a propaganda event through wide coverage by the media. The Missouri received an unprecedentedly warm welcome by both the ruling elite and the public (Váli 1971:125). Apparently, the visit was so crucial for the Turkish authorities that they mobilized the local population to prepare the whole city for the Americans. Years later, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1959), an influential Islamist figure, criticized the situation as “kids gathered around Santa Claus’ sack of gifts would not create such a big fuss as the city dwellers did when an American ship came to Istanbul”. In the Turkish media coverage, in general, the US and Americans received an exaggerated degree of praise (see Bozkurt 2007). Yet this overstated hospitality combined with certain misdemeanors of American sailors caused the first examples of anti-American writings to appear. For instance, *Tasvir*, an opposition paper, published a satirical piece on April 6, 1946 extending gratitude to American sailors since they were the reason that the municipality had finally cleaned up the city (NARA867.911/4-1246), while strong criticisms appeared in *Büyük Doğu* (see Özkök 1947, Be. De. 1947). Another opposition paper, *Hürses*, was temporarily closed down because on its April 7, 1946 issue it asserted that sailors were drunk (NARA867.911/4-1246). Against this backdrop, it is suggestive that Sözen (1985) starts his discussion of anti-Americanism with a quote from Fakir Baykurt, a famous Turkish novelist, which portrays how brothels in Istanbul (and their workers) were prepared for American sailors
from the Missouri. In any case, the disturbance generated by American soldiers’ conduct, and Turkish governments’ indulgence thereof, was to become one of the major issues of Turkish anti-Americanism.

The Truman Doctrine and American Aid: Capitulations

The Agreement on Aid to Turkey that regulated the American assistance to be provided to Turkey within the framework of the Truman Doctrine was signed on July 12, 1947. It soon became a foundation for most of the future bilateral agreements (Sander 1979: 26). The Aid Agreement sowed the seeds of various complaints to be directed at the US. While determining the general conditions under which the Turkish government could utilize the assistance, the Agreement furnished the US government with extensive powers. The American representative assigned to Turkey would have the authority to oversee the aid and check that it was being used efficiently and, in consultation with Turkish authorities, to determine the necessary conditions for continuation of the aid. Moreover, in accordance with the American public’s right to information, the Turkish government was obliged not to obstruct American media institutions’ publications about the utilization of assistance as long as the news did not damage national security (see Ülman 1961: 110-112, Sander 1979: 25-27).

As problems arose in the following years, such conditions would be seen as interference in Turkey’s internal affairs and independence. Still, even in this period some already voiced concerns to this effect. Some had claimed that the planned aid monitoring mechanism would constitute a new version of Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyun-u Umumiyé) for Turkey (Ülman 1961: 101). For instance, Mehmet Ali Aybar, a law professor who would become the Chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi - TİP) in 1962, asserted that American aid would endanger Turkish national independence (Boran 1970: 44). Aybar warned of efforts to turn Turkey into an “Anglo-Saxon satellite” in Hür daily in February 1947 (Aybar 1968: 92-94, NARA867.00/8-2747). In Zincirli Hürriyet weekly, which Aybar started to publish after Hür had been closed down, it was also claimed that “no sovereign state, except the Ottoman Empire which signed the Sèvres Treaty, had ever accepted aid in form of debt or gratuity” (“Yeni Bir Sevre Doğru”. Zincirli Hürriyet. 5 April 1947: 4). In Aybar’s words:

Cooperation with the US, as it is today, amounts to a return of the capitulations in a worse form... Countries, which are in this situation, are described as «semi-sovereign»... As the American aid might lead to the lowering of our status, no Turk could accept to turn into a slave today for the sake of protecting our independence against the Soviets tomorrow (1947).
During this period those who were outspoken critics of the US included famous leftist novelists like Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin. Ali and Nesin published a series of political satire magazines titled Geveze, Marko Paşa, Merhum Paşa, Ali Baba, Başdan etc. These were later closed down by court orders (see Oral n.d.: 144-156, 176-192). Nesin was sentenced to ten months in prison because he criticized American aid in his article titled “Whither are we going?” which has been typeset at the printing house but not yet published (Nesin 2005: 142-152). Furthermore, Marko Paşa journal disapproved the conditions of the aid and censured those columnists who went so far as to portray Turkish borders as the American frontier (“Nasıl Girer?” Marko Paşa, 15 September 1947 quoted in Gürkan 1998: 133). Zekeriya Sertel (1947, see Ünlü 2002:114-115), a well-known leftist journalist, also complained that the country was being transformed into a “forward defense station”.

Nevertheless, these examples should not be taken to suggest that the aid in particular and bilateral relations in general were being denounced by leftists alone. For instance, Büyük Doğu condemned Turkey’s “slavish submission… to the new master of the country” (Kısakürek 1947). Previously a CHP, then an independent parliamentarian, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur published several articles in the pro-DP Kuvvet daily to the effect that aid could damage Turkish independence and honor, and that probable future US interference in domestic affairs should be prevented (Kuvvet, 13 March 1947 and Kuvvet, 20 March 1947 quoted in NARA867.00/8-2747). Fuat Köprülü, one of the leaders of the DP, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP) warned of the possibility that aid conditions might incur excessive concessions (Harris 1972: 27-28).

Hence, following the conclusion of the agreement, the government strove to convince the public that cooperation with the US was inherently different than the Ottoman capitulations, and that it would not endanger Turkish sovereignty under any circumstances (Sander 1979: 27). In this context, the media reports, in general, praised the aid and asserted that the US could not be deemed to be an imperialist state as it had not demanded territory or bases from Turkey (Erhan 2001: 532). As Sander (1979: 29) pointed out, the most salient feature of these reports was their assessment and presentation of the agreement as a military alliance treaty which obliged Washington to undertake national defense of Turkey, even though in reality it merely stipulated a one-sided provision of armaments and equipment. The government also regarded it as a big success that they had finally secured American official support against the Soviet threat.
The assistance provided to Turkey within the framework of the Truman Doctrine was used entirely for military purposes. Even when it was allocated to infrastructural projects such as maintenance or building of roads and improvement of airports, the underlying concern was wholly strategic (Sander 1979: 24). It soon proved, however, that the game was not worth the candle since mere maintenance cost a considerable amount of money, causing the squandering of the dollar reserves stacked up during the World War II (Sander 1979: 25, 45). This, in turn, increased Turkish dependence on American assistance. Nevertheless, Turkey was not initially included in the Marshall Plan because unlike the war-torn economies of Europe, it possessed 260 million USD worth of gold reserves. Only after persistent appeals by the Turkish government, the Economic Cooperation Agreement (Armaoğlu 1991: 168-180) under the Marshall Plan was eventually signed by the two parties on July 4, 1948.

As with the military assistance, economic aid was based on conditionality. Article 8 of the Agreement stipulated the establishment of an Economic Cooperation Mission within the US Embassy to supervise the use of economic aid (Erhan 2001: 541). Furthermore, the Marshall Plan assigned Turkey a different role from European countries. The aid conditions amounted to some sort of development plan. But the problem was that its priorities were determined according to the Marshall Plan’s grand strategy instead of the country’s vital necessities. The grand strategy, that aimed at the reconstruction of post-war Europe, charged Turkey with supplying Europe’s agricultural and the US’s metal demands, such as chrome (Erhan 2001: 540). Thus Turkey was driven towards agricultural rather than industrial production. Some considered these conditions to be a type of development plan that aimed to satisfy imperialist needs of the US as opposed to fulfilling Turkish national interests. For instance, Geveze weekly protested that the US forced the Turkish government to export wheat stocks, compelling people to eat barley instead (“Dikkat” Geveze, 15 September 1948 quoted in NARA867.917/9-2148, Ünlü 2002:136). Aybar (1968: 150-152) asserted that the state’s decision to halt industrialization following American advice would lead to a higher risk of foreign exploitation.

The country’s destiny is out of our control, like sand pouring through fingers... Our politics is controlled by Washington as President Truman comments on our national matters every three months in a careless manner as if talking about a colony (Aybar 1968: 159-160).

In Başdan weekly, it was claimed that the ECA served only American interests in an unfair fashion and declared that they would never stop
saying, even if threatened by imprisonment or death, that American aid in its current form was against Turkey’s national interests (“Amerikan Mandası mı Kuruluyor?“ Başdan, 12 October 1948 quoted in NARA867.917/10-2248). Geveze defined the agreement as a lethal blow to national sovereignty (Aybar 1968: 139-140, NARA867.917/8-2648), and presented it as an attempt to protect the interests of some well-heeled American businessmen in search of new markets for their goods, calling upon all citizens regardless of their political orientation to fight together to forestall American influence infiltrating the country and to free themselves (Aybar 1968: 144-145, NARA867.917/9-2148).

As stated above, reactions were not limited to leftists alone. The rightist *Yeni Sabah* daily claimed that the ECA targeted Turkey’s financial and judicial independence (*Yeni Sabah*. 12 August 1948, NARA867.917/10-2248, Erhan 2001: 541). The front page article with the headline “Severe and Sorrowful Conditions that Nobody Could Realize” criticized “the innumerable and unlimited concessions granted to Americans” (“Kimsenin Farkına Varamadığı Ağır ve Hazin Şartlar”. *Yeni Sabah*. 10 August 1948), and another article stated that it was astonishing that “our parliamentarians accepted these conditions all together in one session without even negotiating” (“Meğer Neler Kabul Etmişiz?”. *Yeni Sabah*. 10 August 1948).

Meanwhile the public seemed to be dissatisfied with the distribution and the use of the aid. Following his trip to southern cities in January 1952, Waggoner, Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Ankara, reported that people he met had criticized various aspects of American aid to date. For instance, he gave details of public complaints that agricultural aid extended to Adana region achieved nothing more than enriching already rich big land owners (Despatch no: 483, From Mendelin, Ankara 06.03.1952).

The most frequent criticisms targeting the agreements revolved around issues such as the similarity of the concessions granted to the US to the capitulations that had destroyed the Ottoman Empire, and that if the Turkish government limited its own power in its policies, it rendered Turkey a semi-colony and threatened its independence. Years later, it would be asserted that these agreements constituted a milestone in Turkey’s foreign dependency since they enabled Americans to determine the priority areas for aid allocation and thus Turkish economy’s fundamental goals (Erhan 2001: 542). But in that period people who had voiced similar criticisms were subject to oppression. They were immediately labeled as communists. Likewise Americans considered
figures such as Mehmet Ali Aybar, Sabahattin Ali and Aziz Nesin as being under the communist influence of Moscow (NARA867.00 (W)/5-2949, NARA867.917/8-2648). Those who adopted anti-Americanism, in contrast to the mainstream, suffered. Professors who criticized close bilateral relations were fired from their universities; columnists found their dailies and journals closed down (Erhan 2001: 537, Bora 2004: 163).

Military Cooperation: Ally or Colony?

Although cooperation based on economic and military assistance was established with the US by the late 1940s, a bilateral military alliance, the real expectation of the Turkish government, was not realized yet. In this period, the prime objective of Turkish foreign policy was to obtain American security guarantees. NATO membership emerged as the ideal solution. In the aftermath of the rejection of Turkey’s application to NATO, Turkish authorities saw the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 as a good opportunity (Athanassopoulos 1999: 163-164). Even though Celâl Bayar, the then Turkish President, rejected the claims that Turkey had sent troops to Korea to secure its NATO membership, through its participation in the Korean War Turkey was able to demonstrate how useful it could be for the Western security system and to make hesitations about its membership vanish. As a matter of fact, Bayar would state subsequently that the military successes of Turkish troops had proved to be influential in Turkey’s acceptance into NATO (Saray 2000: 98).

Turkey, with a cabinet decision, sent 4,500 troops to Korea. The CHP harshly criticized the government since the DP did not take the issue to the parliament, which was a constitutional requirement (Erhan 2001: 545). Yet they were quick to add that their objection targeted the government’s decision-making process, not the decision itself. In a similar vein, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Nation Party (Millet Partisi) leader, declared that they might be more willing to support the government’s decision if it would help Turkey’s NATO membership, although they initially objected due to security concerns (Ahmad 1977: 391). The strongest criticism was raised by the Turkish Pacifist Association. On July 27, 1950, the Association sent a telegram to the parliament in protest of the government’s action and distributed manifestos stating that the decision was taken due to the US pressure and would serve American rather than Turkish interests (Boran 1970: 44, Tevetoğlu 1967: 626). The Association was immediately closed down; seven of its members were sentenced to imprisonment on the grounds that they had acted against national interests (Tevetoğlu 1967: 626). Additionally, seventeen satirical
magazines were closed down because they published articles and cartoons that were critical of troop deployment in Korea (Erhan 2001: 546).

Waggoner, following another trip to Central Anatolia in 1951, reported that the rural population could not comprehend why Turkey had to send troops to Korea, and thus was skeptical (Memorandum, From Waggoner, 02.11.1951). He further wrote that the CHP tried to capitalize on the issue by attacking the government during the election campaign but the DP’s counter-attack convinced the public when they argued that ‘it would be much better to stop Russians in Korea than waiting for them to arrive at their villages’. Furthermore, according to Waggoner, the public was quite proud of Turkish soldiers’ military successes in Korea.

On the other hand, with regard to Turkey’s admittance to NATO, which was seen as the most critical guarantee for Turkish security against Soviet aggression, the public’s reaction was more one of disappointment than of resentment. People were frustrated because Turkey had not been invited to join to NATO for so long (NARA711.67/11-849). The public was convinced that Turkey had received no formal invitation because American support was not forthcoming (Despatch no: 483). This dark spirit faded after Turkey finally received overt American support (see McGhee 1990) and all Turks “breathe[d] a sigh of relief” (Despatch no: 483). As a matter of fact, in early 1952, a biologist with the US Fish and Wildlife Service, who spent two years in rural Turkey, reported that Turks had now a more favorable opinion of the US compared with 1950, mostly because of the US support for Turkey’s NATO membership. In the eyes of the people, the US was no longer merely a ‘friend’ but was now an ‘ally’ (NARA682.00/2-652). “This means that Turkey is no longer alone and Turks feel a sense of relief that they can now count on international, and particularly American, help when they need it” (Memorandum).

Amidst the general victorious mood of the media, the US was not the subject of criticism but of gratitude as it was helping Turkey. Harris (1972: 44) argues that leftists, already a small group, could not raise their voices either because they were frightened or because they could not get organized. Still, a few adopted a critical stance towards NATO membership, an issue that would constitute one of the major themes of Turkish anti-Americanism in the future. For instance, following the news (“Amerika Atlantik Paktına Türkiye’nin İthalini İstedi”. Hürriyet. 16 May 1951) that the US would support Turkish membership to NATO, Sedat Simavi, owner and editor-in-chief of Hürriyet daily, a centrist newspaper
with the largest circulation, questioned ‘the real intent’ of America, ‘the ally’:

Do not get surprised by this sudden transformation of the US that has not valued us so much as a bug up until now. The US does not care for us without thinking of getting something out of it. They remembered us as they would probably need heroic Turkish soldiers’ muscles… They are looking for guards for American oil… I do not know what else to say to those who want us not for our sake but only for their own interests (Simavi 1951).

Meanwhile some Istanbul and Ankara dailies displayed concern over specific details of Turkey’s admission (Despatch no: 483). Allegations about how Turkey turned into a political, economic and military satellite of the US due to this particular alliance structure would increase in intensity in the following years. In that manner, this ‘war’ against American imperialism would play a crucial role in the apparent rise of the left in the 1960s (Bora 2004: 163).

Privileges and Immunities Granted to American Soldiers: the Rude and Presumptuous ‘Cont’²

Anti-Americanism of the 1960s generally seemed to target American policies. However, some claimed that it was essentially directed against American presence in the country (Váli 1971:137). As explained above, the leftist tradition, which had the opportunity to reach out to more people in the 1960s thanks to the relatively liberal moment in Turkey, had started their own anti-Americanism long before. They mainly emphasized how Turkey was being exploited by American imperialism (about the left’s fight against American imperialism during the 1960s and thereafter, see Güney 2008: 474, Türkmen 2010: 337-338) and how privileges granted to Americans endangered Turkish sovereignty. Besides, agreements allowing the establishment of joint military installations and the granting of immunities to American personnel were all concluded during the 1950s. Like the bilateral agreements mentioned above, these agreements were subject to criticisms as well. Thus even before the 1960s, the ‘privileged’ American presence had already generated serious reactions, or an “embryonic anti-Americanism” as Sözen (1985: 129) put it.

The biggest problem concerning the daily relations between Turks and Americans stemmed from the fact that the Turkish government had practically no criminal jurisdiction over American personnel who violated the Turkish law. According to the Statute of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which
was ratified by Turkey on March 10, 1954, the US had the right to build military installations and bases and to station military forces in Turkey. Article 7 of the SOFA and a subsequent Turkish law (no. 6816) authorized only the US officials, and not Turkish ones, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over American personnel in cases where the commanding authority reported that a criminal act had been committed during the performance of an official duty. The Turkish authorities were obliged to accept the “duty certificate” (Akipak 1967) with no interrogation and to return the officer to his/her superiors (Sander 1979: 106-108, Váli 1971:140).

The Turkish government’s granting of such a big concession to the Americans meant a transfer of sovereign rights, in the eyes of the public. Therefore, even small incidents had a disproportionately big impact on the people’s psyche (Sözen 1985: 129). As the reactions grew, in response to a parliamentary question by CHP parliamentarian Selim Soley, the Minister of Justice had to disclose the crime statistics involving Americans (NARA982.61/2-559).

The problem was not limited to American citizens’ legal immunities. As Turkish-American relations gained momentum throughout the 1950s, the number of resident or temporary American personnel and citizens increased substantially. Meanwhile, they entered new fields of activity. However, with increased contact between Americans and the Turkish people, new social and cultural problems emerged. On the one hand, their mere presence was reminiscent of colonial administration. On the other hand, Americans, particularly the officers, seemed to be reluctant to leave their compounds and intermingle with local population, and this form of behavior was considered to be a sign of “disgust for anything local” as well as of disdain (Sözen 1985: 129). As early as 1952, an American representative reported that as Turks became acquainted with Americans as individuals, they were “impressed by our technical proficiency and our energy [but not by] our manners, culture or wisdom” (File 350). Indeed, this observation might hold some truth. In critical media coverage, Americans were characterized as a ‘rude’, ‘vulgar’, ‘uncivilized’ yet still a ‘presumptuous’, and ‘arrogant’ nation. In these circumstances, Americans were less and less likely to be treated with generous tolerance, especially if things went wrong.

Americans also realized that relations between the two peoples, particularly in big cities, were far from matching the friendly relations between the two countries. The US Embassy believed that the problem stemmed from an American image of Turks as “backward and inferior” and that they did not
show any interest in understanding Turkish people (NARA682.00/2-652). However, this particular assessment would change in the following years, as the number of negative incidents increased and the Turkish public’s reactions became harsher. For instance, in the summer of 1957 in Izmir three incidents occurred in a row (for an earlier example see Aybar 1968: 146-147, “Amerikan Mandası mı Kuruluyor?” Başdan, 12 October 1948, NARA867.917/10-2248). On August 9, in Kahramanlar a USAF sergeant, who caught a boy stealing his wallet, was attacked by the boy’s mother, drawing a crowd of 50-60 bystanders. On August 11, in Esrefpaşa a USAF airman was stabbed while he was riding his motorbike on a crowded street. Finally, on August 12, in Yeni Foça five Turkish ladies were molested after they got on an American ship for a short visit at the invitation of sailors. The last incident in particular was reported in the media in a most scandalous manner. The USAF Chief of Staff in Izmir described the incidents as an “ugly demonstration of latent anti-American feeling”, whereas the American Consul in Izmir argued that these three seemingly unrelated incidents, “although perhaps indicative of hardly perceptible long-range subconscious trend” were in fact a political scheme aiming to discredit the DP government (NARA611.82/9-2857). According to him, the scheme aimed to incite the public against the government through the following logic: “the [DP] administration permits foreigners to survey Turkish waters and coasts, thereby abdicating or abridging Turkish sovereignty. With sovereignty breached, the foreigners appropriate everything in sight, including Turkish women. All true Turks must rally round the flag and throw out this [DP] administration which so recklessly permits our sovereignty and our women to be sullied” (NARA611.82/9-2857).

Soon afterwards, a number of American sailors got involved in a Turkish flag tearing incident in Izmir, provoking further reactions:

Dogs! You idiots, you are too thickheaded to understand what it means to tear the Turkish flag... We are neither a colony, nor a satellite or Negroes... Make sure that you do not return to your country in a coffin from this land to which you came on your own feet. This is the last warning! Our blood is boiling... (Öztin 1957, NARA611.82/12-1157).

By 1958, the US authorities’ concern regarding the resentment for the American presence in Turkey was increasingly evident (NARA982.61/9-2458, NARA982.61/9-1558). The situation led American representatives to conduct a comprehensive analysis. They concluded that although the major underlying reason was a distrust of foreigners, a common but dormant trait of Turks, the increasing trend of anti-Americanism was caused by two factors: stirred-up Turkish nationalism due to the incidents
involving American citizens and the opposition’s strategy to put the DP government in a difficult position (Despatch no: 267, From Ball, Ankara 31.10.1958). Since these incidents were mostly covered by the opposition media, Americans regarded the anti-American sentiment as part of an attempt to attack the Menderes government. This point of view, though partly aimed at exonerating Americans of any misconduct, might also hold some truth. During the 1950s, an overwhelming majority of the population believed that Washington actively supported the Menderes government at home instead of the alternative political forces. Thus criticisms targeting Americans would hit the DP indirectly. Still, American representatives feared that the sentiment might turn into national feeling.

Nevertheless, they relied on Turks’ judgment since they observed a Turkish consensus that their country’s interests and future were closely attached to the West and particularly to the US. For this reason, they hoped that Turks would not risk endangering the close relations between the two countries, thereby losing the benefits this relationship had to offer. Even so, anti-American feeling at that time proved that “with many Turks affection and/or friendship is only skin deep at best”, a condition that might facilitate an easy stirring-up of anti-Americanism. It led Americans to conclude that continuous agitation could indeed harm the bilateral relations (Despatch no: 267). The American Embassy launched a public diplomacy campaign to ‘enlighten’ the Turkish people about the US and Americans in Turkey. Besides Headquarters of the United States Logistics Group (TUSLOG) in Ankara published a pamphlet informing Americans about appropriate codes of behavior in Turkey (“Türkiye’deki Amerikalılar İkaz Edildi”. Dünya. 15 November 1959).

Against this backdrop, a traffic accident occurred in November 1959 whipped up anti-American sentiment. Lt. Colonel Allen L. Morrison, an American officer stationed in Adana, ran over a group of Turkish soldiers on the sidewalk while driving under the influence of alcohol. As a result, one soldier was killed and eleven others were injured. Since the acting chief of the Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) had issued a duty certificate for him claiming that Morrison was on duty on the night of the accident, he was tried by a US Army court martial. The fact that he was merely fined 1,200 USD and sent back home stirred a deep feeling of injustice and restarted the public debate on the SOFA (Erhan 2001: 559, NARA611.82/11-1959). Two CHP parliamentarians submitted parliamentary questions about the offences committed by Americans. They asked which other NATO countries had concluded simi-
lar agreements and had accepted such offences to be reverted to American jurisdiction, and whether the agreement was based on reciprocity ("Amerikalıların Çıktığı Olaylar Meclise Getirildi". Dünya. 14 November 1959, NARA611.82/11-1959). The incident, which once again revealed that American officers were exempted from Turkish jurisdiction, incited widespread and bitter criticisms. Press reports and editorials asserted that even drunk soldiers who had just got out of night clubs were issued duty certificates, which practically served as an insurance policy, and that “sacred American courts would not sentence an American” (Akın 1959, NARA611.82/11-1959).

The arrogance of our American friends, who are our guests, has been aggravated day by day... [the explanations] conveniently ignore the obvious lack of manners and decency of Conis, who rose to the military profession from ox-herding, but instead focus on eccentricity of Turkish customs and traditions in order to prove that peculiarity of Turkish praxis is the cause of all disagreements and reactions... Due to a hollow superiority complex, [the American] wants to disregard the local order wherever he goes (Altan 1959).

[It demonstrates that] people of the country of frequent blackouts, broken phone lines, water cuts, filthy streets flooded with spits, no regular running of public transportation are more civilized than Americans whom mechanical civilization could not make advanced (Ulunay 1959).

As explained above, Americans had already been prepared for these kinds of criticisms. In their opinion, the incidents intensified anti-American sentiment because of the fact that they directly hurt the deepest national sensitivities, the prevailing inferiority complex of Turks, their envy of Americans’ rich lifestyle (NARA982.61/11-2759), the perception that American citizens were not thoughtful about Turkish society’s traditions and values, the still fresh memory of the capitulations, grave differences between the two social systems, and the frequent misunderstandings between the two peoples (NARA982.61/12-1659).

Meanwhile, it is worth noting the self-censorship by the Turkish press. After the Morrison incident had hit the headlines, Arnold Hanson, Public Affairs Officer in Istanbul visited the editor of Dünya, a pro-CHP daily. Following the visit, on December 15, 1959, Falih Rifki Atay, publisher of the paper, blamed anti-Americanism in Turkey on Soviet propaganda and called on Turkish citizens to act with common sense and not to be fooled by the reds. Furthermore, Atay advised American soldiers to move with
more discretion, and the Turkish press to act with more caution in order to decrease anti-Americanism in Turkey (NARA611.82/12-1859).

The issue of privileges granted to American officers fed into the sovereign/nationalist strand of Turkish anti-Americanism. It also became a component of the colonialization debate. Socially-based criticisms, on the other hand, targeted the American identity despite the fact that they had been sparked by nationalist concerns. According to Katzenstein and Keohane (2007: 12), anti-Americanism is essentially expression of negative feelings or attitudes towards American identity or in other words, “what the U.S. is” and “what the U.S. does”. Following this distinction, social frictions and cultural criticisms, which will be covered in the next section, concern who the American is, his/her attitudes and the value system he/she promotes.

**Cultural Anti-Americanism**

In line with the global trend, anti-Americanism in Turkey did not remain as an attitude or ideology unique to the left but spread to rightists and conservatives as well. Starting from the 1950s, nationalist-conservative groups’ discontent with Westernization was directed towards the American influence in the country (Bora 2004: 158).

However, the US created a huge dilemma for nationalist-conservatives. First of all, since no nation would willingly submit to a client-patron relationship unless it had to, it would be hard for those who subscribe to nationalist ideology to swallow that their country has established such a relationship with another state. Thus anti-Americanism that feeds on sovereign-nationalist concerns, could be expected to emerge and take root among these groups. Yet the Turkish case proved to be quite different. The ensuing dilemma was cured by intense anti-communism, one of the backbones of nationalist-conservative ideology (Bora 2004: 156). Anti-Americanism became synonymous with advocacy of communism, thus was to be absolutely refused or at least to be avoided. Secondly, as the US epitomized the West’s cultural degeneration in the eyes of nationalist-conservatives, cultural anti-Americanism gradually settled in among them. In Bora’s (2004: 159) words, “the average Turkish nationalist-conservatism is an amalgam of cultural anti-Americanism and political Americanism”.

This dilemma is manifest in Kısakürek’s work. Kısakürek (1959) regarded political Americanism as the mandatory direction for Turkey. He argued that “any anti-communist world view is obliged to [support] the American policies, albeit reluctantly”. Yet, in the meantime, he labeled American
cultural influence as “evil”: “It is horrible that the American has penetrated into us with his language, style, appearance, psychology and culture, or at least what he claims as culture” (Kısağür 1959).

Within the framework of Turkish-American relations, shaped, as explained above, in the 1950s, the US appeared as not only political and economic but also as a social model. The ruling elite set a target for the country of “becoming little America”⁴. However, conservatives perceived an existential threat in the Americanization of Turkish society from a cultural perspective as much as they feared the threat of communist subversion, notwithstanding their dependence on American political and military support against communism. For this reason, anti-American sentiments and attitudes among these circles remained limited to cultural anti-Americanism. For instance, they campaigned for Rock’n’Roll music and dance to be prohibited, and forced the government to request visiting US Navy bands not to play this type of music during their public concerts (NARA882.451/4-257).

Moreover, American schools in Turkey were seen as tools of cultural imperialism and as agents of moral degeneration of Turkish youth. In particular, Büyük Doğu weekly’s articles to this effect “Amerikan Koleji, Rezaletler Rezaleti”. Büyük Doğu. 29 May 1959, 13: 8-9., Dedektif X 1959) were found disquieting by the American authorities who believed the weekly had deep political and financial backing. Even though Americans considered Büyük Doğu as the representative of “the know-nothing xenophobia and fanaticism of reactionary chauvinists” and thought that it might be influential only on the segment of the population which was “not only anti-American but anti-foreign by blind conviction and utter ignorance”, they were frustrated by the government’s tolerance of such an open manifestation of anti-Americanism and its disinclination to take any punitive actions (NARA882.432/7-259).

From this perspective, cultural anti-Americanism that stems from worries about the possible erosion of Turkish culture and values under American influence has persisted till today.

**Economic Anti-Americanism**

As is mentioned above, with regard to the ‘American aid’ which started with loans and continued with Marshall Plan, the left in particular asserted that the aid program had an imperialist nature and would transform the country into a semi-sovereign state with no say in its own future. In the following years, however, new criticisms were added with remarkably dif-
different themes. This time, the complaint was not about the aid itself or its conditionality but instead about its amount not being as much as that to which Turkey was entitled. The line of thinking that prevailed among the majority was that it was the rich Americans’ responsibility to provide aid to Turkey while the latter was duly fulfilling the precarious military commitments on its part under the Cold War conditions. Therefore, cutting off or reducing the aid was perceived almost as an insult by some (Váli 1971:145-146). American Embassy reports in the early 1950s frequently warned about a possible severe shock that any reduction in aid might cause among Turks (Circular no: 60).

In 1955, nonetheless, the DP government’s plan to improve the deteriorated economy through obtaining more American aid was not well received in Washington. The Americans turned down the Turkish demand for an additional 300 million USD, putting the blame squarely on the Turkish government’s faulty economic policies and incompetence (Uslu 2000: 104). To make matters worse, Washington’s official explanation for the rejection was rather harsh, and even Prime Minister Adnan Menderes found it humiliating to Turkish national pride (Sander 1979: 138).

The American authorities believed that Menderes had avoided the hard road of taking austerity measures to ameliorate the economy. Instead the Prime Minister had tried to shrink the budget deficit with the help of American aid, while telling people that the economic problems were minuscule and temporary. They were profoundly disturbed by criticisms to the effect that the US reluctance to increase the economic aid was caused not by economic problems resulting from Ankara’s mismanagement but by the Americans’ stinginess. In consequence, the public, which had already been convinced that Turkey deserved more material support from the US, easily attributed national problems to the Americans’ “bad faith” (NARA611.82/5-555). As criticisms gradually turned into accusations against the American administration for rejecting Turkish requests for an increase in aid, the Americans considered the reactions to be part of an organized campaign that the Turkish government had encouraged, if not directly managed. They were concerned that through such a campaign, present grievances generated by the American presence might easily turn into a virulent and endemic anti-Americanism since “there exist both a mechanism for arousing anti-American feeling and a mentality receptive to being aroused” (NARA611.82/5-555).

Press reports and editorials followed a similar line of rhetoric with previous examples. They still criticized ‘American aid’ using frequent references to
‘capitulations’, ‘conditionality’, and ‘American interference in domestic affairs’, albeit from a very different perspective this time:

How sad it is that after almost 30 years after the elimination [of capitulations], the same spirit wishes to spoil the aid to Turkey by a friendly country… Any friendly country, which will open a large and long term credit, may wish to ask how the money will be spent, and according to what program and plan…But it can have no right to determine the direction of the country which is driven by Turkey’s own needs and requirements of developments. If not, we can neither believe in such a friendship nor welcome such a loan (Gökçe 1955, NARA611.82/5-555).

What followed this campaign was a shrinkage in the “traditional reservoir of good will towards the US in Turkey”, which was caused by government’s “mild case of anti-Americanism” (NARA611.82/8-257). In this period, certain policies of the Menderes government were seen as indicators of a new trend in Turkish-American relations in particular and in its foreign policy orientation in general, signaling the end of the honeymoon period (see Seydi 2011/2). For instance, American representatives took several foreign policy initiatives by the Turkish government towards Egypt and the Soviet Union as signs of the Turks’ drifting away from Washington. Yet, they cautioned that this official version of anti-Americanism could be a strategic move by the Turkish government to persuade the US to be more receptive to the Turkish demands rather than indicating a real change of heart on the part of the Turks (NARA611.82/8-257).

Turks complained about not having received the well-deserved American economic and political support in bilateral relations since the US failed to appreciate Turkey’s strategic and political value. This complaint has persisted and periodically has become a part of the political rhetoric.

**Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism**

American reports in the 1950s highlighted the sound consensus between the Turkish government and the opposition parties in the country with regard to foreign policy (Circular no: 60) and asserted that “if Turkish foreign policy is tied to any single anchor, that anchor is the United States” (Despatch no: 117, Ankara 15.08.1958). It was reported that the Turkish perception of the ‘communist threat’ was very similar to that of the American perception and that furthermore, Turks were terrified by the possibility of a dissolution of the Western alliance or that the US would abandon its leadership role, slipping towards isolationism. For these reasons, they observed, Ankara followed American foreign policy steps exactly
and almost automatically (Circular no: 60). Similarly, Váli (1971:133) claims that the Turkish governments did not make a realistic assessment of their own interests within the context of Turkish-American relations until the 1964 Cyprus crisis; instead they religiously copied American foreign policy.

During the period covered by this study, even though “Turks have sought [American] views on all important [foreign policy] issues… before Turkish position taken” (NARA611.82/6-1853), certain American foreign policy initiatives led to reaction in Turkey. Against this backdrop, the cases of the Palestinian issue, the Baghdad Pact and the Cyprus problem will be examined.

American representatives reported that the US’s moral and political leadership in Turkish eyes was damaged and that Turks had lost faith in the US because of its policies concerning the partition of Palestine (NARA711.67/12-947). In fact, after the UN General Assembly had adopted the Partition Plan for Palestine in November 1947, criticisms of the US appeared in the press. For instance, some denounced American efforts to “justify” the plan (“Amerika Filistinin Taksim Plânını Müdafaâ Ediyor”. Tasvir. 24 November 1947). The daily Cumhuriyet saw the UN resolution as a tragic injustice whereby the US had imposed its own wish upon its satellites (Doğrul 1947b), while Memleket newspaper described the US support for the resolution as dreadful (NARA867.00/12-547). The daily Tasvir criticized the way Truman favored Jews (Baban 1947), and claimed that the US’s Palestinian policy did not make any sense and it would not be compatible with democratic principles and the world peace policy that the US championed (Sabit 1947). Nonetheless, the reaction was not abiding or resolute because although the plan was regarded as being unfair to Palestinians and Arabs, the real concern was about the future of the Western alliance rather than the future of the Palestinians. Within the context sketched out above, Turks were essentially worried about the possibility that the plan would generate hostility towards the US and its allies among the Arab/Muslim societies, thus creating a rift within the anti-Soviet bloc which was not so easy to keep together. Hence, the Soviets would penetrate to the Middle East with relative ease (for instance Doğrul 1947a). Indeed, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak announced that the government had no particular plan with regard to the Palestinian issue, yet was committed to comply with the UN’s future resolutions in order not to disturb regional peace and stability, even though they thought that the partition resolution was an unfortunate and perilous step (NARA867.00/2-1948).
The same concern that erroneous policies of the US would eventually lead to the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, was also valid for the Baghdad Pact. For instance, it was a widespread criticism that the US hesitation to join the Baghdad Pact would generate adverse results such as encouraging the Soviets and Syria in their rather aggressive policies in the Middle East (NARA982.61/9-2557).

On the other hand, when the issue at hand directly concerned Turkish national interests, more severe criticisms against the US were expressed. For example, during the second half of the 1950s, the perceived low-level support by Washington for Turkey concerning the Cyprus problem created disappointment (NARA611.82/8-2957). Americans were accused of failing to thoroughly comprehend the realities and of assessing Turkey’s political, economic, strategic role and significance in the Middle East. Moreover, they were blamed for withdrawing their support from Turkey for the sake of Greek-American votes (for instance see Kaya 1957, “Amerikalı Dostlarımız”. Akis. 4 February 1956, 6 (91): 15, NARA982.61/8-2657).

The Turkish heart’s disappointment at the American administration tends to turn into hatred. Mr. Eisenhower became so childish to the point of being incapable of not calculating what enemy… would be pleased by such moves… Here is what we expect from this short-sighted great friend: ...they should understand that if Cyprus, as a whole, is not returned to the Turks, any defense of the Greeks or any effort to put off the issue would bring the doomsday to Turkey and the Middle East (Safa 1957).

As the gradual worsening of the Cyprus problem demonstrated, resentment of ‘what the U.S. does’ was to increase inevitably when American foreign policy initiatives clashed with Turkish interests.

**Domestic Politics and Anti-Americanism**

Another aspect of the US foreign policy that was frequently criticized in Turkey during the period under study was Washington’s support for dictatorships and repressive regimes around the world. Such criticisms gained a special meaning within the context of the Turkish domestic politics rather than that of the American foreign policy. The opposition papers, in particular, exacerbated the issue. They claimed that anti-Americanism, which was becoming prevalent in the Western Europe, Latin America and the Middle East in the 1950s, fed mainly on American support of ruthless dictators reigning in those regions. The Turkish opposition papers depicted the generous support extended by “the leader of the free world” to oppressive regimes that curtailed

For instance, the Akis magazine promoted the “Ugly American” (Lederer and Burdick 1958), book which would become a universal symbol of anti-Americanism in years to come. In its presentation, the magazine underlined how the disregard by American ambassadors of the problems of oppressed local populations generated foreign policy issues and claimed that Fletcher Warren, the then American Ambassador in Ankara, belonged to this class of diplomats (“Çirkin Amerikalı”. Akis. 8 September 1959, 16 (267): 7, NARA611.82/9-1659). While these and similar articles criticized close and friendly relations that the US had been sustaining with authoritarian leaders such as Batista, Peron, Chiang Kai-shek, Franco, and Salazar and how Washington had been pouring in money into these administrations, they in fact targeted American support of the Menderes government and implied that without such support the government could not survive a day (Ergüder 1959, “Diktatörleri Destekleme Siyasetinin Tehlikeleri”. Yeni Sabah, 3 January 1959, NARA611.82/8-459). Harris thinks that this argument had a point. Recalling the opposition’s slogan with regard to the American aid: “if Allah does not provide, America will”, Harris (1972: 81) claims that the US failed to build a neutral image among Turks. Moreover, he maintains that as the purposeful propaganda by the DP leaders about the existence of a special relationship between themselves and Washington became successful, at the same time it hurt the American image in Turkey.

In the same fashion, Nureddin Ardiçoğlu, a member of the Republican Nation’s Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi) published an article in the Millet newspaper, the official publication of the party, on June 8, 1954, where he questioned the US’s sincerity in promoting a genuine democracy in Turkey, claiming that the US’s real interest with regard to Turkey was to garner geopolitical and strategic advantages. Ardiçoğlu was arrested on the same day as the article was published. He was convicted on three counts in accordance with Article 161 of the Penal Code: disturbing the country’s and government’s international prestige; attributing opportunist motives to a fellow country; and creating animosity among the public towards a country with which national interests dictated the maintenance of close cooperation (NARA611.82/8-2754).

American representatives regarded, in part, these criticisms as a reflection of a rising anti-Americanism in different corners of the world. But more importantly, it was seen as a strategy of indirect domestic opposition utilized by press editors who were terrified of attracting the fury of the Press Court in case they were to openly criticize the Menderes government. According to Americans, the opposition was trying to convince the Ameri-
can administration to support them instead of the Menderes government, claiming that just like American support to dictatorial regimes generated anti-American sentiment in those countries, support to the “dictatorial” Menderes government would produce the same result in Turkey (NARA982.61/6-1858).

At the same time, American officials judged the criticisms as being misdirected and unreasonable since they contradicted the demand raised by anti-American circles in Turkey which were asking the US not to intervene in domestic affairs (NARA982.61/6-1858) and since the critics, likening democratically elected Menderes to Franco, an obvious dictator, implied that the DP majority in the parliament was secured not by the Turkish electorate but by American aid (NARA611.82/8-459).

The US’s relations with incumbent governments and their impact on domestic politics have since been a constant matter of reproach, which have frequently been interwoven with conspiracy theories raised by various opposition forces in the context of various political debates.

**Conclusion**

Between 1945 and 1960, the US was successive Turkish governments’ strongest ally. Turkey’s new national goal was set as to become a ‘little America’. Uncle Sam was presented to the public as a selfless, altruistic “adorable friend” who had been protecting and supporting Turkey (Bozkurt 2008: 362). But nevertheless in this period anti-Americanism was present. Almost all the components of anti-Americanism, which would get fiercer in the following years, had already created bitter resentment and contempt.

The major causes of anti-Americanism in this period were quite similar to the causes in later periods. The negative sentiment seemed to be derived from the belief that economic and military rights and concessions granted to Americans that endangered national sovereignty, from the perception that the US’s intervention in domestic affairs stemming from its immense influence on the country was turning Turkey into a colony, and from the conviction that the US simply disregarded Turkish sensitivities when the two countries’ interests clashed. Moreover, anti-Americanism could have been used by the opposition forces as a strategic tool. Because of close relations between the Menderes government and the US, or the image thereof, any criticisms towards Americans would indirectly hurt the government. Social differences and the prosperity gap between the two nations only become meaningful against this background. Furthermore, cultural anti-Americanism, which was basically caused by the concern that American culture could take hold in Turkish society quite easily, did not prevent its adherents from embracing political Americanism.
Turkish anti-Americanism was not a political stance or ideology that appealed to the Turkish masses. It remained an attitude adopted by seemingly marginal activists mostly from the left. Yet it should be emphasized that even in these years criticisms were not only voiced by leftists but also by rightists at times.

As demonstrated by the March 1, 2003 bill, anti-Americanism could have consequences for Turkish foreign policy in general and for Turkish-American relations in particular. However, at this early stage when its roots were newly sinking in, anti-Americanism did not have any impact on successive Turkish governments’ policies. Yet as the archival documents reveal, even the existing form of anti-Americanism forced both the Turkish government and American authorities to be more cautious with regard to public reactions to their policies. The main reason for this state of affairs was Turkish governments’ over-dependence on the US on political grounds and their pro-American propaganda which built on American security guarantees and economic aid. On the other hand, although Turkey adopted the multi-party system during the period covered in this paper, democratization and liberalization were far from infiltrating all layers of society. Therefore, even though there were various groups who adopted anti-Americanism, they did not have the opportunity to make their voices heard, and they were frequently prosecuted as alleged communists. As Kı sakürek (1959) maintains, “even the slightest degree of anti-Americanism, regardless the viewpoints of proponents, would be understood as endorsement of the Soviets”. Conversely, Çetin Altan (1964) claims that obstacles to public expression of anti-Americanism in Turkey were a legitimate social and political concern that has ironically caused the US to attach less value to Turkey than to other countries with a pervasive anti-Americanism:

If people in Turkey could speak up, who did not like, but criticized, the US, pinpointing its mistakes, the US itself would attribute as much importance to us as they do to Greece.

Consequently, anti-Americanism between 1945 and 1960 could not engender a consequential political movement. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the major issues and causes of anti-Americanism in this period sheds light on subsequent periods and even on the 2000s when anti-Americanism reached a record high on a global scale.

Notes

1 Americans believed that the Turkish desire to establish close political cooperation with the US and their harsh anti-communist stance did not stem from their attachment to liberal or democratic values but from their obsessive fear of the Russians. According to them, just like “the Irish view most matters of internal and foreign policy through the
distorted lenses of Anglo-phobia, the Turks, like the Swedes, view most matters of domestic and foreign policy through the distorted lenses of distrust and apprehension of Russia” (NARA711.67/9-1945).

2 Turkish pronunciation of ‘Johnny’, which has become a nickname for the American soldier with pejorative overtones.

3 The argument that the disparity of living standards between Turks and Americans caused anti-Americanism in Turkey had some Turkish proponents as well. For instance, Coşkun Kırca wrote in Yeni Gün on June 4, 1957, that anti-Americanism, the psychosis of the day, was mainly caused by the concessions granted to American citizens which amounted to a new version of the capitulations, and also in part by the apparent economic inequalities between locals and their American guests (NARA982.61/6-1957).

4 Celâl Bayar pledged in 1957 that they, as the DP government, would turn Turkey into a “little America” (Hale 1981: 88). Yet (Ünlü 2002: 142) writes that Nihat Erim had made the same statement in 1949, long before Bayar.

References


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Öz

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Корни антиамериканизма в Турции в 1945-1960 годы

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Аннотация
Принято считать, что антиамериканизм в Турции возник в результате Кипрского кризиса в 1964 году. Тем не менее, корни турецкого антиамериканизма лежат в «беспроблемном» на внешний вид периоде-1945-1960 годах. Льготы, предоставленные США в Турции, их вред экономической и политической независимости страны, положение Турции в этих отношениях не как равного союзника, а больше как колонии, обеспокоенность тем, что внутренние и внешние дела Турции формируются в соответствии не с турецкими, а с американскими интересами, претензии к культурному американскому империализму составили основные элементы и причины турецкого антиамериканизма. Возникшие в эти годы антиамериканские взгляды в последующие годы развивались вокруг этих же основных тезисов с небольшими изменениями. Поэтому исследование данного периода проливает свет не только на период «бурного» антиамериканизма в Турции в 1960-е годы, но и на современное его положение.

Ключевые слова
Турция, США, антиамериканизм, 1945-1960, турецко-американские отношения, турецкая внешняя политика

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