Turkey – EU Relations after the Failed July 15 Coup Attempt

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Abstract

Turkey tackled a great threat to its democracy on the night of July 15, 2016. Turkish people defended democracy out on the streets against the putschists. Evidence gathered thus far shows that the coup attempt was planned and executed by the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ). This paper aims to look at (a) Turkish political context and the reasons behind the rise of anti-Westernism and Euroscepticism in the post-July 15 period and (b) the possible impacts of the failed July 15 coup attempt on Turkey – European Union (EU) relations. It argues that the EU should foster its solidarity with Turkey in its fight for survival of its functioning state and democracy and enter into a dialogue to pay attention to Turkey’s sensitivities in its fight against FETÖ in post-July 15 period. This is essential for challenging the rise of Euroscepticism in Turkey and keeping the EU relevant as a normative reference point for Turkey’s democratization.

Keywords

Turkey, European Union, coup, July 15, FETÖ, Fethullah Gülen

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Introduction

The night of July 15, 2016 will always be remembered as a major landmark in Turkish political history. On that night, the Turkish people defended democracy and freedom out on the streets against the putschists who were attempting to control the streets with tanks, flew very low with F16 fighter jets in populated areas, bombed the parliament building, attacked the presidential palace and the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), and shot innocent unarmed civilians trying to resist them. Despite the putschists’ curfew declaration, the people responded to the call of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan via various TV channels to go out to the streets and protect Turkish democracy. Ordinary people joined the security forces in defending and protecting state institutions, airports, and TV channels such as the state broadcaster Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) and the private network, CNN Türk. All the happenings were broadcast live on television and social media. Pro-government and independent TV channels took an anti-coup position. Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, members of parliament from the Justice and Development (AK) Party, opposition leaders and politicians, civil society representatives, and army officers fighting against the putschists declared their determination through television and Twitter accounts to foil the attempts to overthrow President Erdoğan and the elected government by force. There is no doubt that a sense of unity and memories of past coups encouraged people to leave their homes to resist the coup. As a result of the failed coup attempt, 240 people were killed and approximately 2000 people were injured. Through the outstanding bravery of the Turkish people, the coup attempt was averted.

This paper first looks at the political context and the reasons for the rise in anti-Westernism and Euroscepticism in Turkey after the failed July 15 coup attempt. It then explores the possible impacts of the events of July 15 on Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU). The conclusion summarizes the arguments presented in the paper.

Political Context in Turkey After the Failed July 15 Coup Attempt

Evidence gathered so far, including testimony and confessions from captured army officers, shows that the coup attempt was planned and executed by the followers of the Gülen movement in the army and Fethullah Gülen, a
cleric living in Pennsylvania in the United States (US), masterminded it. In May 2016, the National Security Council of Turkey referred to this group as the Fethullahist/Gülenist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ). Following the failed coup attempt, Turkey declared a state of emergency for three months. All Gülen movement-linked institutions in Turkey including schools, universities, media outlets, hospitals, foundations, unions, business groups, and charities were shut down through state of emergency decrees and the assets of these institutions were seized. It is well known that Gülenists have been infiltrating state institutions including the judiciary, the police force, and the army for years. Hence, one of the first policies of the government after the declaration of the state of emergency was to remove known Gülenists from state institutions and to suspend civil servants who were thought to be Gülenists until an investigation into their involvement with FETÖ was finalized. Turkey also demanded the extradition of Fethullah Gülen from the US.

The US administration’s cautious official statement in the early hours of the coup attempt was evaluated as a wait-and-see approach dependent on the course of events during the night. This hesitation to condemn the coup attempt and the US administration’s positive relationship with the Sisi regime following the military coup in Egypt made many Turks question the sincerity of US support for democracy in Turkey. In addition to suspicions stemming from the fact that Gülen had been living in the US since 1999, the idea that the US was behind the coup attempt gained more popularity with statements from the US General, Joseph Votel, and Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, expressing their concern regarding the army purge and the arrests of their “interlocutors” in Turkey (Lake 2016). This occurred despite the involvement of such “interlocutors” in the failed coup attempt. Moreover, there are serious questions about the motivation behind tweets sent by the US-based intelligence firm Stratfor (2016), which was tracking Erdoğan’s plane while his life was under threat. The lack of any high-level political visits to Turkey by its Western allies in the first month after the coup attempt left a bad taste in people’s mouths.1

Moreover, immediately after the coup, international media’s major focus was on the purge rather than the failed coup attempt and its perpetrators. The post-July 15 purge was portrayed as a crackdown on the political
opponents of Erdoğan and the AK Party. On the other hand, there were several reports and articles on Gülen and how he represented moderate Islam while the people resisting the coup attempt were portrayed as Islamists. Gülen's conspiracy theory about Erdoğan staging the coup himself and using it as a pretext for getting rid of his critics and opponents was given widespread coverage (Fontanella-Khan 2016, Guyoncourt 2016, Reuters 2016a). Instinctive and emotional calls from many Turks to reinstate capital punishment for the coup plotters and Erdoğan's declaration to approve such a move if it came before parliament were also in the spotlight. Political figures and editorials in leading newspapers in the US and European countries called for “restraint,” “calm,” and “moderation” in Turkey by targeting the usual “authoritarian” suspect, Erdoğan.

Paying little attention to the extraordinary resistance of the Turkish people on the night of July 15 in the international media and instead portraying Turkey's reactions to the coup attempt as “dictatorial” and “Islamist” and obsessively targeting Erdoğan were not very well received in Turkey (see Senyücel Gündoğar and Yırcalı 2016, Anadolu Agency 2016). It is important to note here that certain Turks who were opposed to Erdoğan criticized the coverage of the failed coup attempt in international media as well (see Mert 2016, Voices of July 15, 2016). Indeed, all of these fueled anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism, and Euroscepticism in Turkey. Being one of the primary historical “Others of the West” and specifically of Europe, for Turkey, these phenomena were not novel (Dağı 2005, Güney 2008, Yılmaz 2011, Gülmez 2013, Kadercan 2016). In addition to their historical roots, how Turkey was perceived and treated by the US and European countries played an influential role in the rise of anti-Westernism in Turkey. Hence, the post-July 15 political mood in Turkey is expected to influence Turkey's relations with the US and the EU. Among other factors, the final US response to Turkey's demand for the extradition of Gülen will play a significant role in the future of Turkey–US relations until there are satisfactory developments for Turkey. The remainder of this paper will focus on the potential effects of the July 15 coup attempt on Turkey–EU relations.

Impact of the July 15 Coup Attempt on Turkey–EU Relations

The EU has played an influential transformative role in Turkey's democratization as an anchor of political, economic, and administrative reforms since its candidacy declaration in 1999. The EU’s conditionality
provided Turkey with a roadmap for its reform agenda. Since coming to power in November 2002, the AK Party introduced significant reforms: first, to begin accession negotiations with the EU and later, to further Turkey’s accession process. The party has always kept Turkey’s EU membership as a strategic goal. It is undoubtedly the AK Party that brought Turkey the closest to the EU with its reform agenda based on Europeanization. That said, after beginning accession negotiations in 2005, the EU’s handling of Turkey’s accession process, certain member states’ stiff opposition to its EU membership, and Western policies in the Middle East caused disillusionment among the AK Party leadership and Turkish public opinion regarding the EU. When the AK Party faced challenges in domestic and foreign policy, it became rather cautious in responding to EU conditionality in its reform agenda and adopted a more autonomous foreign policy. This was evaluated as the slowing down of the AK Party’s pace of Europeanization after 2005. European observers of Turkish politics have declared their concern about Turkey’s democratic backsliding since that time. The Turkish government’s handling of the Gezi park events and corruption allegations against then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and various other ministers prompted notably strong EU criticism in 2013 and 2014 (European Parliament 2014).

The prospects for Turkey’s admission to the EU were not very bright a decade after Turkey began accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005 (Phinnemore and İçener 2016). As of July 15, 2016, 16 of the 35 negotiation chapters were open and only one was provisionally closed. Hope for progress emerged in October 2015 when the EU showed its political commitment to “re-energize” Turkey’s accession process as part of a deal to obtain Turkey’s assistance and support in managing the Syrian refugee crisis and to fight international terrorism (Council of the European Union 2015a: point 2a). Following the Turkey–EU summit in November 2015, the Commission emphasized its commitment to complete preparatory work for opening a number of chapters in the first quarter of 2016 (Council of the European Union 2015b: point 4). Additionally, the EU pledged to grant Turkish citizens visa-free travel in the Schengen zone by the end of June 2016 if Turkey met the criteria of the EU’s visa liberalization roadmap (ibid.: point 5). While getting closer to the July 2016 deadline, the Commission stated that there were 5 out of 72 benchmarks that still needed to be met by Turkey for the visa liberalization roadmap. The main
stumbling block is Turkey’s anti-terror laws, which Turkey refuses to change considering the terrorist attacks and threats particularly coming from the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and DAESH (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). On May 6, 2016, Erdoğan resolutely stated that Turkey would not revise its anti-terror laws in exchange for visa-free travel and told the EU “we will go our way, you go yours” (TRT World 2016). Evidently, Turkey’s EU accession process was not entirely smooth even before the July 15 coup attempt.

A number of issues are likely to have an impact on Turkey–EU relations after the July 15 coup attempt. First, the general feeling in Turkey over the EU’s reaction to the coup attempt is bitter disappointment. There is increasing questioning over the EU’s sincerity in supporting democracy and its solidarity with the Turkish people. This is still the case even though the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the EU High Representative strongly declared on behalf of EU member states that “[t]he EU fully supports the democratically elected government, the institutions of the country and the rule of law” in the early hours of July 16 during their Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Mongolia (European Commission 2016). Additionally, the Council of the EU stated on July 18 that “[t]he EU strongly condemns the attempted coup in Turkey and reiterates its full support to the legitimate institutions of the country” (Council of the European Union 2016). This was followed by the EU’s call for “the need to respect democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and the right of everyone to a fair trial in full compliance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, including Protocol 13 on the abolition of the death penalty” (ibid.). These statements clearly show where the EU stands politically regarding the failed coup attempt. However, for Turkey, these statements cannot escape being considered standard political declarations emphasizing the EU’s concerns without demonstrating genuine solidarity with the Turkish people.

The key factor here is the failure of high-level EU officials and member state leaders to visit Turkey. Similar evaluations of the EU’s weak solidarity with Turkey were made following terrorist attacks in Ankara and Istanbul in 2016. As noted above, European newspapers’ criticism of post-coup policies
rather than a focus on the Turkish people’s resistance to military coup contributed to the rise of Euroscepticism in Turkey. Other statements were also not helpful such as a tweet from the former British Liberal Democrat Member of the European Parliament (1999-2014) and key Turkey expert in Europe, Andrew Duff, on the night of July 15. Duff (2016) stated, “Never mind Fetullah [sic] Gülen, if the army has taken over to defend democracy and the rule of law in Türkiye [sic] so be it”. Indeed, in the days immediately following the failed coup attempt, EU officials and member state leaders missed a golden opportunity to visit the bombed parliament building of an EU candidate negotiating for membership and to commemorate those who were killed defending Turkish democracy on the night of July 15. In the post-July 15 period, EU officials will need to demonstrate stronger signs of solidarity with the Turkish people to convince skeptics of their sincerity in opposing the coup in Turkey.

Second, the EU may seriously risk being a legitimate reference point in Turkish debates on democratization if it fails to grasp the country’s domestic political dynamics. When Turkey began EU accession negotiations on October 3, 2005, the European Commission’s then-President, José Manuel Barroso, stated that “Europe must learn more about Turkey. And Turkey must win the hearts and minds of European citizens. They are the ones who at the end of the day will decide about Turkey’s membership” (European Commission 2005). Looking at the post-July 15 rise of anti-Westernism in Turkey, it is evident that the business of winning the hearts and minds of people should not be a one-way exercise.

To understand why so many people have been suspended from their duties or purged from the police, judiciary, media, schools, universities, and the bureaucracy, it is essential to obtain more information about FETÖ, its global activities, and its complicated organizational network in the Turkish bureaucracy and private sector. Indeed, understanding the activities of FETÖ, which portrays itself as an education movement dedicated to peace, dialogue, and serving humanity, is a challenging task for outsiders. All major political actors in Turkey exhibited unity and solidarity against FETÖ in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt. There have been real signs of overcoming political and social polarization of recent years. Opposition figures in the parliament and the media freely review and criticize the
government’s post-July 15 policies and decisions. The EU and EU member states are expected to contribute to the emerging positive political environment. To challenge Euroscepticism in Turkey and to keep the EU relevant as a normative power in Turkey, European actors are expected to increase their contacts with their Turkish counterparts and to visit Turkey in order to understand the details of the coup attempt, why FETÖ is seen as the main culprit, and the “logic” of the post-July 15 policies. This is not to say that the EU should avoid its criticism of Turkey when its policies are not in line with EU norms and values; rather, it should be an informed critic. Diplomats, political parties, civil society organizations, universities, business groups, and human rights organizations have roles to play in this exchange of information for a more democratic Turkey.

Third, Turkish people gave their lives to protect the stability of Turkey’s institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights on the night of July 15. Turkey continues to be committed to respecting democracy, human rights, the right to a fair trial, and the rule of law and it has not changed its reform priorities either. A healthy approach for the EU to take in addressing Turkey’s post-July 15 policies and decisions will be to open negotiations on Chapter 23 (judiciary and fundamental rights) and Chapter 24 (justice, freedom and security). This will be both a major boost for Turkey–EU relations and will provide a continuation of the relevance of EU norms and values for Turkey by opening channels of influence during a politically sensitive period. The main obstacle here is the veto of Cyprus. This reiterates the importance of resolving the Cyprus issue as a key factor in Turkey’s progress towards EU membership. Even if negotiations regarding these two chapters are not opened soon, it is certain that the EU will continue to call on Turkey to respect membership criteria and the EU acquis in its response to the coup attempt during the state of emergency rule and thereafter. The Commission’s progress reports will scrutinize Turkey’s post-July 15 policies. While preparing the reports, the Commission consults Turkish authorities, various pro-government and opposition actors, and its delegation in Ankara to obtain a clearer picture on what is happening in Turkey. Gülenists, without doubt, will also try to shape European discourse on Turkey. Gülenist academics, journalists, and civil society organizations are very active in key EU countries such as Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK) and they know Eurospeak perfectly well. For a
balanced approach to Turkey in such a fragile political period, it is vital that EU officials pay meticulous attention to the identities and affiliations of people and institutions when they receive analyses and information on Turkey.

Fourth, the furor over restoring the death penalty for coup plotters in Turkey influences the debates on Turkey–EU relations. The death penalty issue clearly provided certain opponents of Turkey with an excuse to thwart Turkey’s bid for EU membership. Following the calls to reinstate the death penalty for coup plotters during anti-coup rallies and democracy vigils across Turkey that lasted twenty six days and following Erdoğan’s unquestioning approval of the emotional will of the people who were rallying, the EU was unsurprisingly quick to remind Turkey that “the unequivocal rejection of the death penalty is an essential element of the Union acquis” (Council of the European Union 2016). The Commission president, Juncker, also declared that accession negotiations would be halted if Turkey reinstates the death penalty (Reuters 2016b). While these statements were reminders of EU membership criteria to Turkey, Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern suggested abandoning accession negotiations with Turkey by criticizing its democratic standards and Turkey’s response to the coup attempt (Reuters 2016c). Similarly, Austrian Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz declared that he would veto opening new accession negotiation chapters with Turkey (Reuters 2016d). There were also other calls to expel Turkey from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in international media. That said, it would be an exaggeration to argue that there is widespread public and official support for reinstating the death penalty in Turkey. Turkey’s ambassador to the EU, Selim Yenel, stated that it was “only a discussion” and “[t]he EU is jumping the gun prejudging the outcome while we are still discussing about it” (Reuters 2016e). Moreover, Turkey’s Prime Minister Yıldırım “cooled down” the debates on the death penalty in a parliamentary group meeting by arguing that “[t]he death penalty is a one-time death, but there are deaths worse than death for the coup plotters” (Hürriyet Daily News 2016). Turkey is not expected to risk its membership to European institutions by reintroducing the death penalty. Additionally, such a move will put Turkey’s extradition demands from the US and the EU at risk. However, if the issue continues to be raised in political discussions, the EU will surely continue to remind Turkey that rejection of the death penalty is an essential criterion
to be part of the European family. Insistence on the issue is likely to cause further difficulties in relations with European institutions and countries. That said, recent signs from the Turkish administration indicate that public anger is being addressed in moderation.

Fifth, it would not be wrong to assume that a significant concern for many European policy makers on the night of July 15 was the fate of the Turkey–EU refugee deal. As noted above, Turkey sees visa-liberalization for Turkish citizens as a part of the deal and rejects changing its anti-terror laws under existing security threats to Turkey. Clearly, issues regarding the deal’s implementation predate the July 15 coup attempt and indeed, its fate will depend on the post-July 15 political context of Turkey–EU relations. Opponents of the deal have been critical of commitments made to Turkey as they accuse Turkey of shifting towards authoritarianism and not respecting freedom of expression and dissent. Similar criticisms intensified as a result of Turkey’s state of emergency policies. The debate over the death penalty and the statements from Austrian officials mentioned above are examples of such criticisms. That said, Angela Merkel and the Commission, the primary architects of the deal, continue to back it and are working toward its implementation. With Turkey’s absolute determination to fight with FETÖ in the post-July 15 period, it would be naïve to expect Turkey to dramatically change its anti-terror law. However, it is important to note that Turkey left the door open to “modify” the law and “look at some wordings” “if the changes don’t impede the fight against terrorism and if Turkish citizens are guaranteed visa-free travel in Europe” (Cook 2016). Turkey affirmed visa-free travel for Turkish citizens as its “red line” by publicly declaring that if the EU does not offer Turkey a clear date for visa-free travel, it will back out of the deal (Reuters 2016f). Thus, the EU’s continued failure to understand the post-July 15 domestic political context in Turkey and its failure to adopt discourse and policies accordingly may risk pushing Turkey away from the EU.

Finally, there is the issue of how to manage Turkey–EU relations during this tense political period. Amid increasing pessimism over the prospects for Turkey’s EU membership, Turkey’s ambassador to the EU, Selim Yenel, reiterated the Turkish government’s target and commitment for joining the EU by 2023 during an interview given after the failed coup attempt
(Deutsche Welle 2016). On the other hand, the EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, questioned Turkey’s commitment to meet EU membership criteria—and its commitment to join the EU—by arguing that Turkey violated the rule of law in its post-July 15 purge (Rettman 2016). Considering the problems surrounding its accession process, the question as to “whether Turkey should join the EU” will continue to be featured in debates on the future of Turkey–EU relations in both Turkey and the EU. Evidently, the result of the Brexit vote in the UK put alternative and differentiated forms of integration high on the EU political agenda. If and when such an agreement is concluded between the UK and the EU, it will set a precedent for debates on the future of EU enlargement. Additionally, Turkey is the most likely candidate for an alternative relationship, short of membership with the EU, alongside the UK.5

There is no better EU deal than EU membership. However, continued stalling of accession negotiations without any real hope of membership due to political obstacles and lack of progress in taking positive steps such as visa liberalization for Turkish citizens may lead Turkey to withdraw its EU membership bid and seek a partnership with the EU instead. This will make Turkey less receptive to EU conditionality and it will continue pursuing its multidimensional foreign policy without an EU anchor. An officially “unwanted” Turkey may further lose its trust in the EU. And a “less EUropean” Turkey will be more unpredictable for the EU. The possible partnership deal, if ever agreed upon, might be fragile. Political developments and statements in the post-July 15 political context signal that if both sides do not exert strong political will for a common future, further deterioration of their relationship is a distinct possibility. The history of EU enlargement has proven that the EU can be flexible with its conditionality and thus far, Turkey has demonstrated that it is very pragmatic in its relations with the EU. Hence, both parties—and their key political actors—need further strategic thinking regarding their future relations by considering the common problems and challenges they face. A way forward is possible and necessary for peace and stability in Europe and its neighborhood. A first step for the EU in this direction will be to foster solidarity with Turkey by entering into a dialogue that focuses on Turkish sensitivities in the fight against FETÖ. Turkey will undoubtedly respond positively to such a move.
Conclusion

Turkey tackled a great threat to its democracy on the night of July 15, 2016. Many people were killed and injured while defending their democratic institutions and elected politicians against the putschists. Investigation into the failed coup attempt showed that FETÖ was behind the insurrection. After declaring a state of emergency for three months, the Turkish government made decisions to eliminate the FETÖ threat. Following the coup, a strong political consensus has emerged among the AK Party and the major opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), to fight against all terrorist threats and work for amendments to the constitution. A great disappointment for Turkish political parties and public opinion following the coup attempt was the failure of its Western allies in exhibiting strong signs of solidarity with Turkey. It took more than a month for these allies to visit Turkey’s bombed parliament. Moreover, a sharper focus on the Turkish government’s reactions to the coup attempt rather than on the significance of the coup attempt and the people’s heroic resistance to putschists in the international media and the statements of US and European officials made many Turks question the sincerity of Western governments and institutions’ opposition to a military coup in Turkey. This played a role in the rise of anti-Westernism and Euroscepticism after July 15. This is a fact but it cannot be read as Turkey turning its back on the West. There is no questioning of its NATO membership and Turkey is committed to join the EU.

This paper primarily focused on the potential impacts of the failed July 15 coup attempt on Turkey–EU relations. Supporting the claim that both Turkey and the EU need each other to address common challenges and threats to peace and security in Europe and its neighborhood, this paper argued that the EU has a role to play and a stake in challenging rising Euroscepticism in Turkey in the post-July 15 period. This will require an exchange of information and official visits that focus on the threat of FETÖ and the failed coup attempt. In their actions in the post-July 15 period, Turkish political actors have worked toward the normalization of the Turkish political system with its fight against FETÖ, which established a parallel state structure within the Turkish state. It is important that the Turkish government declared its commitment to act within the rule
of law in its fight against the putschists. Hence, the EU should focus on keeping the EU relevant for Turkey as a normative reference point for liberal democratic principles by maintaining open channels of dialogue and offering constructive criticism when necessary. Indeed, further Europeanization of Turkey is part of the solution.

What Turkey experienced on the night of July 15 was very traumatic and it will continue to fight against more than one terrorist organization in the post-July 15 period in this fragile neighborhood. The EU should foster solidarity with its would-be member Turkey in the fight for the survival of its functioning state and democracy.

Endnotes

1 The Council of Europe’s Secretary General, Thorbjørn Jagland, visited Ankara on August 3-4. The first leader to visit Ankara was the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, on August 5. President Erdoğan paid his first official visit to Russia after the coup attempt on August 9. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Turkey on August 12. Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevičius became the first high-level EU member state politician to visit Turkey after the July 15 coup attempt on August 22. Elmar Brok, the chair of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Kati Piri, the European Parliament’s rapporteur on Turkey visited Turkey as the first high-level political figures from EU institutions between August 23 and 25. The first high-level visit from the US administration was on August 24 by Vice President Joe Biden.

2 For a critical analysis on this issue, see Kardaş and Balçı (2016).

3 These chapters include Chapter 15 on energy, Chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights, Chapter 24 on justice, freedom, and security, Chapter 26 on education and culture, and Chapter 31 on foreign, security and defense policy.

4 See Eriksson (2016) for Gülenists’ activities in Brussels.

5 See for example Pisani-Ferry et al. (2016).
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15 Temmuz Başarısız Darbe Girişiminin Ardından Türkiye – AB İlişkileri

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Öz


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Отношения Турции и ЕС, после неудачного переворота в 15 Июля
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Аннотация
15 Июля 2016 года ночью, Турция ликвидировал серьезную угрозу для демократии. Той ночью народ Турции выходя на улицу стояли против переворота, и защитили демократию. Доказательства, собранные после попытки переворота показывают, что переворот планировали участники ФЕТО (Фетхуллах террористическая организация). Целью данной статьи является исследовать политическую обстановку в Турции в период после 15 июля, причину растущей оппозиции к Западу и европейской скептицизма, и последняя, выявить влияние неудачного переворота на отношений Турции и ЕС (Европейский Союз). В данной работе подчеркивается что, Евразийский Союз за существование функционирующих государственных структур и демократии, и в понимании чувствительности Турции в борьбе с ФЕТО, необходимо оставаться в диалоге с Турцией и показывать больше солидарности. Это важно в борьбе с растущей Евроскептицизма в Турции, также имеет важное значение для того, чтобы продолжать в качестве нормативной точки отсчета, в Демократизация Турции.

Ключевые слова
Турция, Евразийский Союз, переворот, 15Июль, ФЭТО, Фэтхуллах Гюлен

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